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ADMINISTERING SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT AFTER SHELBY COUNTY
Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer*
Until the Supreme Court put an end to it in Shelby County v.
Holder, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was widely regarded as an
effective, low-cost tool for blocking potentially discriminatory changes to
election laws and administrative practices. The provision the Supreme
Court left standing, section 2, is generally seen as expensive, cumber-
some, and almost wholly ineffective at blocking changes before they take
effect. This Article argues that the courts, in partnership with the
Department offustice, could reform section 2 so that it fills much of the
gap left by the Supreme Court's evisceration of section 5. The proposed
reformation of section 2 rests on two insights: first, that national survey
data often contains as much or more information than precinct-level
vote margins about the core factual matters in section 2 cases; and sec-
ond, that the courts have authority to regularize section 2 adjudication
by creating rebuttable presumptions. Most section 2 cases currently turn
on costly, case-specific estimates of voter preferences generated from
precinct-level vote totals and demographic information. Judicial deci-
sions provide little guidance about how future cases-each relying on
data from a different set of elections-are likely to be resolved. By creat-
ing evidentiary presumptions whose application in any given case
would be determined using national survey data and a common sta-
tistical model, the courts could greatly reduce the cost and uncertainty of
section 2 litigation. This approach would also reduce the dependence of
vote dilution claims on often-unreliable techniques of ecological infer-
ence and would make coalitional claims brought jointly by two or more
minority groups much easier to litigate.
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INTRODUCTION
Widely lauded as one of the most effective statutes ever enacted, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) finally made good on the promise of the
Fifteenth Amendment.' The VRA outlaws the use of "tests or devices" as
a prerequisite to voting, and section 2 of the statute further prohibits
state and local governments from structuring elections "in a manner
which results" in members of a group defined by race or color "hav[ing]
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."2
Sections 4 and 5 target states and localities with a history of black disen-
1. See, e.g., Charles S. Bullock III & Ronald Keith Gaddie, The Triumph of Voting
Rights in the South 323 (2009) ("The consensus is that the [VRA] has been inordinately
successful."); Samuel Issacharoff et al., The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the
Political Process 514-16 (4th ed. 2012) (noting "guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were essentially disregarded in many states" before passage of VRA, which
"transformed American politics in a variety of ways").
2. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. II 2015). The VRA was formerly codified in various sec-
tions of Title 42, but all of its provisions have been moved to the new Title 52 as part of an
editorial reclassification. U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Law Revision
Counsel, Editorial Reclassification Title 52, U.S. Code, http://uscode.house.gov/editorialr
eclassification/t52/index.html [http://perma.cc/W9DQHMBJ] (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
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franchisement, requiring these states to obtain prior approval from the
federal government before implementing any changes to their election
laws. The principal question in these "preclearance" proceedings is a
simple one: Would the change make minority voters worse off?' The ju-
risdiction seeking preclearance bears the burden of proving it would not.
In June 2013, the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder put the
preclearance mechanism on ice.4 The Court found the coverage formula
(which determines the states and localities subject to preclearance) fa-
cially unconstitutional, faulting Congress for not updating the formula
when Congress reauthorized section 5 in 2006.5 Justice Kennedy mused
that section 5 was probably not needed in any event because discrimina-
tory voting changes can also be blocked, preimplementation, by prelim-
inary injunctions in lawsuits brought under section 2.6 Leading election
lawyers disagree.7 Section 2 litigation is costly and rarely results in pre-
liminary relief; 8 moreover, Shelby County further undermines the already
shaky constitutional moorings of section 2.9
Shelby County's impact was felt immediately. A number of states that
had been subject to the preclearance process quickly adopted or imple-
mented new, restrictive voting laws. For example, the day Shelby County
was decided, Texas announced that it was implementing its strict voter-ID
3. Preclearance could also be denied if the change was adopted for discriminatory
reasons. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (mandating target jurisdictions seek preclearance and
demonstrate proposed restrictions "neither [have] the purpose nor will have the effect of"
abridging voting rights on basis of race (emphasis added)).
4. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
5. Id. at 2628-29, 2631.
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96).
7. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, "Voting Law Decision Could Sharply Limit Scrutiny of
Rules," Election Law Blog (Feb. 28, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://electionlawbog.org/?p=47852
[http://perma.cc/58SW-UMJN] ("Justice Kennedy seems to mistakenly believe that section
2 liability plus preliminary injunctions would be just as good as section 5 liability."); J.
Gerald Hebert & Armand Derfner, More Observations on Shelby County, Alabama, and the
Supreme Court, Campaign Legal Ctr. Blog (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.campaignlegalcen
ter.org/news/blog/more-observations-shelby-county-alabama-and-supreme-court [http://
perma.cc/9MBU-V27L] (arguing Court overestimated efficacy of preliminary injunctions
under section 2).
8. Hebert & Derfner, supra note 7 ("The actual number of preliminary injunctions
that have been granted in the hundreds of Section 2 cases that have been filed over the
years is quite small, likely putting the percentage at less than 5%, and possibly quite
lower.").
9. See infra section II.A (describing constitutional requirements for section 2 claims);
cf. Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future Jurisprudence of
Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSblog (June 25, 2013, 7:10 PM), http://scotusblog.com/
2013/06/the-curious-disappearance-of-boerne-and-the-future-jurisprudence-of-voting-rights
-and-race/ [http://perma.cc/A42B-9R5T] ("[T]he Court for now seems to have foreclosed
greater deference for voting decisions under Congress's Fifteenth amendment powers[,
which] could spell trouble for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ... and other laws aimed
at preventing race discrimination in voting.").
2015] 2145
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(identification) requirement, which section 5 had previously blocked.'0
Voter-ID laws recently adopted in Alabama" and Virginia 2 were also
freed to take effect.'3 Two months later, North Carolina enacted a sweep-
ing election reform bill that the president of the state's National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) chapter
called, "the worst voter suppression law since the days of Jim Crow.""
During the same month, Mississippi passed new ID requirements for vot-
ing.' Local governments freed from preclearance also made some im-
portant changes. The city of Pasadena, Texas, replaced two district coun-
cil seats in predominately Latino neighborhoods with two at-large seats
elected from the majority-white city.' Galveston County, Texas, cut in half
the number of constable and justice-of-the-peace districts, eliminating
virtually all of the seats currently held by Latino and black incumbents.7
And the city of Macon, Georgia, moved the date of city elections from
November to July, when black turnout has traditionally been low.' 8
With Congress divided and slow to respond to Shelby County," then-
Attorney General Holder pledged to do all he could to protect voting
10. Ryan J. Reilly, Harsh Texas Voter ID Law "Immediately" Takes Effect After Voting
Rights Act Ruling, Huffington Post (June 25, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/06/25/texas-voter-id-law_n_3497724.html [http://perma.cc/437C-RCJW]. Texas
also announced that i s legislature's 2011 redistricting maps would immediately take effect.
Id. Preclearance had been denied because a three-judge panel of the District Court for the
District of Columbia was "persuaded by the totality of the evidence that the plan was en-
acted with discriminatory intent." Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 161 (D.D.C.
2012).
11. Ala. Code § 17-9-30 (2014).
12. Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-643 (2015).
13. Alabama had passed the photo-ID law in 2011 but had not requested preclear-
ance because the Secretary of State's office had yet to develop rules for implementing the
law. Kim Chandler, State Has Yet to Seek Preclearance of Photo Voter ID Law Approved in
2011, AL.com (June 12, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/06/photo voter_
id.html [http://perma.cc/FC6P-ELRH].
14. Zachary Roth, N.C. Wants Voting Law Emails Kept Secret, MSNBC (Jan. 9, 2014,
2:54 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/nc-wants-voting-law-emails-kept-secret [h tp://
perma.cc/4VNY-2GUK]. North Carolina's Voter Information Verification Act takes effect
January 1, 2016. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-166.13 (Supp. 2014).
15. Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-563 (2015).
16. SCOTUSblog, After Shelby County, YouTube, at 00:25 (Nov. 4, 2013), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=u._Eo97odboQ [http://perma.cc/AN25-CD2D].
17. John Suayan, Lawsuit: New Galveston Co. Electoral Map 'Racially Discriminatory,'
Se. Tex. Rec. (Aug. 27, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://setexasrecord.com/stories/510622002-laws
uit-new-galveston-coelectoral-map-racially-discriminatory [http://perma.cc/H874-FQ7C].
18. Ga. Voters Surprised Macon Election Change Isn't Challenged, NPR Morning
Edition (Feb. 6, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/02/06/272359791/voting-right
s-act-update (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
19. It was not until January 2014 that the civil rights community and its allies in
Congress came forth with draft legislation responding to Shelby County. Voting Rights
Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014). The bill would bring only
four of the formerly covered states back under section 5, see Summary of the Voting Rights
Amendment Act of 2014, Advancement Project, http://www.advancementproject.org/page
2146 [Vol. 115:2143
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rights using the remnants of the VRA.20 The Department ofJustice (DOJ)
challenged new voting restrictions in Texas and North Carolina under
section 2,21 and other private and public lawsuits are in the offing.22
This Article takes up the question of whether section 2 can be made
to function like erstwhile section 5 in the post-Shelby County world. We
argue that it can-provided that courts, litigators, and DOJ come to un-
derstand two fundamental points. First, national survey data often con-
tain as much or more information about core evidentiary matters in
section 2 cases than the precinct-level vote tallies and demographics that
have been the grist of voting rights litigation for the last generation. De-
mographic and legal changes are undermining the conventional sources
of evidence for many section 2 cases, but at the same time, advances in
survey administration, reweighting, and model-based estimation of local
political preferences from national surveys are generating new kinds of
evidentiary materials that speak to the central factual questions in these
cases. Second, because section 2 is a "common law statute" (or statutory
provision), the courts have authority to create rebuttable presumptions
to guide and regularize the adjudication of section 2 claims."
We show that the courts could create rebuttable presumptions under
section 2 that would give the statute special bite in many jurisdictions for-
s/summary-of-the-voting-rights-amendment-act-of-2014-introduced-january-16-20#sthash.fP
oBAqJb.dpuf [http://perma.cc/8PX3-UC7J] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (noting proposed
coverage formula would likely cover only Texas, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana), not-
withstanding that much broader coverage (using a different formula) is readily justified,
see Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial
Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102
Calif. L. Rev. 1123, 1166-69 (2014) [hereinafter Elmendorf & Spencer, Preclearance]
(showing coverage formula based on racial stereotyping could reach most of the formerly
coveredjurisdictions).
20. See Sari Horwitz, Justice Department to Challenge States' Voting Laws, Wash.
Post (July 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/justice-department-to-chall
enge-states-voting-rights-laws/2013/07/25/c26740b2-f49b-11e2-a2fl-a7acf9bd5d3astory.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/Y2TM-MSB2] ("'[W]e plan ... to fully utilize the [VRA's] remaining
sections to ensure the voting rights of all American citizens are protected."').
21. Josh Gerstein, DOJ Challenges N.C. Voter ID Law, Politico (Sept. 30, 2013, 12:03
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/justice-department-north-carolina-voter-id-
law-97542.html [http://perma.cc/2PVQ-2F3Z]; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice
Department to File New Lawsuit Against State of Texas over Voter I.D. Law (Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-file-new-lawsuit-against-state-tex
as-over-voter-id-law [http://perma.cc/Q5G5-9J37].
22. See Horwitz, supra note 20, at 2 (noting DOJ's plan to utilize sections 2 and 3 of
VRA). For a summary of election law changes in formerly covered jurisdictions since Shelby
County, see States and Localities' Responses to Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, http://
www.naacpldf.org/document/states-responses-shelby-decision [http://perma.cc/V7AT-PZ
NZ] (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
23. Regarding section 2 as a common law statute, see Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common
Law Statutes, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 377, 448-55 (2012) [hereinafter Elmendorf, Making Sense
of Section 2].
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merly covered by section 5. Implemented with national survey data rather
than local election tallies, the new presumptions would greatly reduce
the cost and uncertainty of challenging under section 2 the kinds of elec-
tion law changes that DOJ used to block under section 5. The presump-
tions would also go a long distance toward establishing the "likelihood of
success on the merits" needed for preliminary relief.24
Even if the courts decline our call to create formal evidentiary pre-
sumptions under section 2, mere judicial recognition of the fact that na-
tional survey data shed light on the central factual questions in section 2
cases would breathe new life into the statute. Presently, section 2 cases
are like snowflakes. Judicial rulings on the evidentiary materials in one case
provide little direction for the next case down the pike because these ma-
terials vary so much from case to case (often the courts emphasize voting
patterns in local elections). But if the same national data sets were de-
ployed in case after case, the ordinary processes of common law adjudi-
cation would generate substantial guidance about whether any given
would-be defendant is likely to be held liable under section 2. This is so
whether or not the courts create de jure evidentiary presumptions.
* * *
Plaintiffs in a section 2 case must establish, first, that the challenged
election law, procedure, or practice has a racially disparate impact.5 Sec-
ond, plaintiffs must connect this impact to "social and historical condi-
tions."2 6 In view of Shelby County, the required "social and historical con-
ditions" showing is best understood as a way of testing whether the rem-
edy the plaintiff seeks is proportionate to the present-day risk of uncon-
stitutional race discrimination in the electoral process. Thus, we shall
generally call it the "constitutional risk" requirement, rather than using
the more conventional "social and historical conditions" label.
The presumptions we propose address both prongs of a section 2
claim: constitutional risk and disparate impact. The constitutional-risk
requirement should be deemed rebuttably satisfied if the jurisdiction's
majority-group citizens subscribe to substantially negative stereotypes of
the minority, or if there is an extremely high correlation between race
and reliably partisan voting in the defendant jurisdiction (provided that
actors affiliated with the white-preferred party were responsible for the
election law or practice at issue).27 By shifting the burden of persuasion
to defendants, the courts acknowledge that partisan motives do not merit
24. See Montana v. Suffolk Cty. Legislature, 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(applying likelihood-of-success standard in vote dilution case).
25. Infra text accompanying note 98.
26. Infra text accompanying note 98.
27. See infra sections II.B.1-II.B.2.
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the same presumption of legitimacy in jurisdictions where the partisan
payoff to racial discrimination is exceptional.28
As for the disparate-impact prong, one must distinguish so-called
"vote dilution" cases, which address the rules for aggregating votes into
representation, from "vote denial" cases, which concern barriers to cast-
ing a valid, duly counted ballot.2 9 In dilution cases, districting schemes
and at-large electoral systems are generally said to have a disparate im-
pact if-given white and minority political preferences-they prevent the
minority community from electing a "roughly proportional" number of
minority "candidates of choice" and additional, reasonably compact
majority-minority districts could be drawn.30 Racial minorities have "can-
didates of choice" if and only if the minority is internally politically cohe-
sive.1 And unaccommodating electoral designs threaten the minority's
opportunity to elect only if political preferences are racially polarized,
meaning that a politically cohesive racial majority opposes the minority's
preferred candidates."
Presumptions for the disparate-impact side of a vote dilution claim
must therefore address racial polarization in political preferences and
28. Where there is an extreme correlation between race and partisanship, opposing-
party actors have incentives to target and burden voters on the basis of their race, race
being easier to observe than reliable partisanship. See generally Adam B. Cox & Richard T.
Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 553, 572-
76 (2011) (demonstrating black voters' liberal ideological distribution leads both Democrats
and Republicans to treat them differently than white voters in redistricting).
29. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the
Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 702-03 (2006) (distinguishing "first generation"
VRA litigation focused on vote denial claims from "second generation" litigation attacking
"practices that diminish minorities' voting strength where they were permitted to vote").
30. See J. Gerald Hebert, Paul M. Smith, Martina E. Vandenberg & Michael B.
DeSanctis, The Realist's Guide to Redistricting: Avoiding the Legal Pitfalls 33-61 (2d ed.
2010) [hereinafter Hebert et al., Realist's Guide] ("Although rough proportionality does
not automatically protect a state from liability under Section 2, it is a strong 'indication
that minority voters have an equal opportunity, in spite of racial polarization, to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."' (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994))); Ellen
Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 643, 730-32 (2006) (discussing
proportionality and noting in nearly all cases in which lower courts made finding on pro-
portionality, liability question was resolved accordingly); cf. League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 436 (2006) (beginning "totality of circumstances" inquiry
by assessing proportionality, implying it is especially important factor to consider).
31. See Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 48-50 (stating minority politi-
cal cohesiveness can be demonstrated by "'showing that a significant number of minority
group members usually vote for the same candidates' (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 56 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Brennan,J.))).
32. See id. at 45-48 (describing presence of racially polarized political preferences
and voting as "linchpin" of vote dilution cases because "[i]f there is no racially polarized
voting, 'it cannot be said that the ability of minority voters to elect their chosen represent-
atives is [less than] that of white voters"' (alteration in original) (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S.
at 48 n.15 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.))).
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the related question of whether a given electoral district is a "minority
opportunity district" (MOD)-one that gives minority voters the oppor-
tunity to elect their "candidates of choice."33 Though polarization has un-
til now been gauged on the basis of voting patterns in local elections, this
Article contends that courts may rebuttably presume racial polarization if
plaintiff-race minority citizens in the defendant jurisdiction substantially
diverge from other citizens in terms of their policy preferences, general
political ideology, or socioeconomic status.34 We also offer a presumptive
definition of "minority opportunity district," based on demographics.
Presumptions about disparate impact are harder to craft for vote de-
nial cases, in part because this body of law is still in its infancy. This
Article offers two very tentative suggestions, focusing on the correlation
between race or ethnicity and socioeconomic status, and on demograph-
ic divergence between the populations of eligible and actual voters.
Unlike the coverage formula for section 5 preclearance, there would
be no de jure list of jurisdictions "covered" by the section 2 presump-
tions. Rather, plaintiffs would have to make evidentiary showings at the
start of their case to establish which presumptions apply. We demonstrate
in Part IV that most of these showings could be made using multilevel
statistical modeling and data from existing national surveys, such as the
National Annenberg Election Survey, the Cooperative Congressional
Election Study, and the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project. The em-
pirical results in Part IV suggest that blacks (but not necessarily other
racial groups) are likely to be protected by the presumptions throughout
the Deep South, that is, in most of the formerly covered jurisdictions.
The two fastest growing racial groups in the United States, Asian
Americans and Latinos, are jointly politically cohesive almost everywhere.
This implies that Asians and Latinos ought to have considerable success
bringing "coalitional" vote dilution claims under section 2-which has
not been the case to date.35 However, our results also indicate that Asian
33. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens [LULAC], 548 U.S. at 427-36 (applying
Gingles framework and using term "opportunity district" to describe districts in which
minority voters have realistic chance to elect candidates of their choice); Hebert et al.,
Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 34-37 (introducing "Gingles test" for vote dilution).
34. Defendants could rebut the polarization inference with data from local elections,
but it would not be necessary for plaintiffs to introduce local voting data after establishing
presumptive polarization. See infra section II.C.
35. See generally Ming Hsu Chen & Taeku Lee, Reimagining Democratic Inclusion:
Asian Americans and the Voting Rights Act, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 359, 390-91 (2013) (find-
ing vote dilution suits brought by Asian Americans have been "overwhelmingly unsuccess-
ful," and "the handful of claims involving Asian Americans all ... concern ... the applica-
tion of VRA to multi-racial and 'other minority' groups"); Chelsea J. Hopkins, Comment,
The Minority Coalition's Burden of Proof Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52
Santa Clara L. Rev. 623, 625 (2012) (noting in coalitional claims "courts have expressed
resistance to granting relief without a heightened showing of group cohesion"). Note that
the continued availability of coalitional claims under section 2 is open to question after
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J.). See infra note
284.
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American and Latino plaintiffs may find it harder than blacks to satisfy
the "constitutional risk" requirement.
Although the approach suggested in this Article would not yield an
official list of jurisdictions covered by the presumptions, a pattern of de
facto coverage should emerge as courts and litigants come to a shared
understanding of what the presumptions are and how they may be estab-
lished in a given case. As models and data sources become standardized
(more on this below), litigants will be able to see which jurisdictions face
presumptive liability.
State and local officials in the de facto covered jurisdictions would
have to disprove central elements of a section 2 case, much as covered
jurisdictions bore the burden of proof in preclearance proceedings un-
der section 5. This shifting of evidentiary burdens should make it fairly
easy for plaintiffs to obtain preimplementation preliminary relief, much
as DOJ under section 5 was able to block suspicious changes before they
took effect. In a redistricting case, for example, plaintiffs could establish
the requisite "likelihood of success" by showing that the defendant failed
to create a roughly proportional number of presumptive opportunity dis-
tricts when it was feasible to do so. Or, in a challenge to voter-ID require-
ments, plaintiffs might obtain preliminary relief by showing that the law
was adopted on a substantially party-line vote (thereby establishing par-
tisan intent), that the burden of the law would fall mostly on low-income
voters, and that race and poverty are highly correlated. Because defend-
ants would have to rebut the inference of discrimination where the rele-
vant presumptions apply, section 2 litigation would be costlier for defend-
ants than for plaintiffs, incentivizing defendants to settle quickly and on
terms favorable to the plaintiffs. Lawmakers and election administrators
in these jurisdictions would have correspondingly strong ex-ante incen-
tives to safeguard minority voting rights.36
The balance of this Article unfolds as follows. Part I provides a brief
overview of sections 2 and 5. It also explains the conventional wisdom
that (weak, cumbersome) section 2 is no substitute for (potent, efficient)
section 5, as well as the less widely appreciated fact that section 2 may not
be able to play in the future even the limited role it has played in the past
due to recent developments in law and in statistics.
Parts II, III, and IV develop this Article's proposal for a presumption-
driven section 2. Part II identifies what we take to be the central factual
36. The recently introduced Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014 also aims to fa-
cilitate preliminary relief under section 2, but in a different manner. Though the amend-
ments are not entirely clear on this point, it appears they would replace the traditional
four-prong test for a preliminary injunction with a simple weighing of relative hardship (to
defendants and to plaintiffs), without any consideration of the plaintiffs' likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits. See Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong.
§ 6(b)(4) (2014). Whether this is constitutional is an open question. At best, it permits
plaintiffs to maintain the status quo while a suit proceeds, without the information-forcing
and settlement-inducing benefits of our proposal.
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questions in section 2 cases and explains how they could be answered
using evidentiary presumptions and survey data. Part III steps back and
considers the courts' authority to create the presumptions suggested in
Part II. We argue that judicial authority to establish the presumptions is
pretty straightforward as a matter of law. However, judges may under-
standably be reluctant to exercise this authority without technical guid-
ance from an expert agency. DOJ, assisted by an outside advisory panel,
could provide a useful nudge, issuing non-binding guidelines about data
sources, statistical techniques, and appropriate legal inferences. Part IV
turns to empirical methods and results. We introduce the art and science
of multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP), a recently devel-
oped tool for estimating local opinion from national survey data, and we
present some initial results and maps, highlighting regions of the country
likely to be covered de facto by the presumptions. The online appendix
provides further information about MRP.37
The Supreme Court has long interpreted the VRA pragmatically.38
That pragmatism is now feared by many to be the Act's undoing,3 9 but it
is also grist for the reconstruction offered here. The demise of the VRA is
not inevitable.
I. SECTION 2 AS A WEAK SUBSTITUTE FOR SECTION 5
To frame this Article's proposal, we begin by outlining the standard
understandings of sections 2 and 5, the conventional wisdom that section
2 is weak and ineffective in comparison to section 5, and the looming
threats to section 2 as it has been implemented to date.
A. Conventional Wisdom About Sections 2 and 5
The potency of section 5 is commonly attributed to its substitution of
administrative for judicial procedures; its establishment of a fairly bright-
line results test; and, critically, its placement of the burden of proof on
the party seeking preclearance.40 Congress's delegation of authority to
DOJ to make preclearance decisions meant that the determinations
37. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Technical Appendix, Administering
Section 2 of the VRA After Shelby County, http://www.dougspencer.org/research/s2_Appen
dix.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5Y5-N4MU] [hereinafter Elmendorf & Spencer, Technical
Appendix] (last updated Jan. 7, 2015).
38. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act
in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1389, 1410-20 (2015) (describing
weak foundations in text and legislative history of many canonical opinions).
39. See id. at 1420-38 (predicting further unraveling of Act in absence of normative
consensus about its aims).
40. For an excellent summary of the procedural and substantive differences between
sections 2 and 5 with more detail than provided here, see generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
The South After Shelby County, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 55, 62-86 [hereinafter Stephanopoulos,
The South After Shelby County].
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could be made with a minimum of legal expenses, for covered jurisdic-
tions and would-be plaintiffs alike.
The principal substantive standard under section 5 was reasonably
clear cut. Preclearance was to be denied if the measure "'would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their ef-
fective exercise of the electoral franchise"'4 2 or if it was adopted with a
discriminatory purpose.4 3 Discriminatory intent can be hard to prove (or
disprove)," but the "retrogressive effects" prong of section 5 did a lot of
the work. Congress boiled the retrogression inquiry down to the question
of whether the electoral change would hinder minorities' ability to elect
their "preferred candidates of choice."" DOJ and the courts denied pre-
clearance when a change would reduce the number or reliability of elec-
toral districts that provide minorities with an opportunity to elect minor-
ity candidates46 or would create a material barrier to voting borne dispro-
portionately by minority citizens.47 According to law professor and for-
41. See id. at 65 (" [T]he DOJ shoulders much of the expense of preclearance under
Section 5."). Though covered jurisdictions were permitted to opt out of DOJ review in
favor of a preclearance proceeding before the District Court for the District of Columbia,
52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (Supp. II 2015), this option was rarely invoked, as it was much more
costly for the jurisdiction seeking preclearance. See Stephanopoulos, The South After
Shelby County, supra note 40, at 65 (discussing expense ofjudicial preclearance in contrast
to inexpensive administrative preclearance).
42. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 466 (2003) (quoting Beer v. United States, 425
U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
43. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b)-(c).
44. As a leading treatise notes, "the criteria used to evaluate a plan under Section 5's
purpose prong [were] vast and comprehensive." Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note
30, at 29. Also, the "intent" standard under section 5 was essentially dormant from the
date of the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board until the enact-
ment of the 2006 Amendments to the VRA, which expressly abrogated that decision.
Compare Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (holding section 5
"does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but
non-retrogressive purpose"), with Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120
Stat. 577, 578 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10302-10305, 10308-10310, 10503) (criticizing
Reno and stating Reauthorization Act abrogates that decision).
45. Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act, 120 Stat. at 580-81.
46. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 149-51 (D.D.C. 2012) (inter-
preting section 5 to protect only those districts that give politically cohesive minority com-
munity opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, as opposed to simply opportunity
to elect Democrats).
47. See, e.g., Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 144 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying pre-
clearance to Texas voter-ID requirement because law would create significant barrier to
voting for poor people and racial minorities were disproportionately represented among
poor); Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 299, 329 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying preclear-
ance to Florida's reduction in early voting days because African Americans disproportion-
ately used early voting and reduction represented "material burden" on franchise); Letter
from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, to Keith Ingram, Dir. of
Elections, Office of the Tex. Sec'y of State 5 (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.brennancenter.
org/sites/default/files/analysis/DOJFinalLetterTo_TexasOn_VoterIDLaw.pdf [http://
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mer DOJ staff attorney Michael Pitts, "local officials and their demogra-
phers" in the covered jurisdictions were "acutely cognizant of the stand-
ards for approval and typically tr[ied] to steer very clear of anything that
would raise concerns with the Attorney General."48
Finally, because section 5 put the burden of proof on the party seek-
ing preclearance, the provision was information-forcing.49 Jurisdictions
contemplating an election law change that might disadvantage racial mi-
norities had incentives to gather information about potentially retrogres-
sive impacts and to mitigate those impacts ex ante.5 0 If DOJ remained
worried about potential impacts, it could respond with a "More
Information Request," essentially putting the new law on hold until the
state or local government had gathered enough information to allay
DOJ's concerns.5 '
The world of section 5, then, was a world in which civil rights advo-
cates could block voting changes that might disadvantage the minority
community without spending huge sums of money on courtroom legal
fees, expert witnesses, and the like. For advocacy groups worried about a
change in local election procedures, it was often enough to fire off a let-
ter outlining their concerns to DOJ. DOJ lacked the resources to give in-
depth scrutiny to each of thousands of preclearance proceedings, so it
relied on community groups to flag changes that merited special scru-
tiny.52 Some attorneys general were probably more solicitous of minority
perma.cc/X8GY-ZMVE] (denying preclearance because state's own data showed Hispanics
disproportionately lacked qualifying ID and statute did not adequately mitigate burdens
on voters lacking qualifying ID).
48. Michael J. Pitts, Let's Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to
Samuel Issacharoff's Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 Neb. L.
Rev. 605, 613-14 (2005) [hereinafter Pitts, Let's Not Call the Whole Thing Off].
49. This point is emphasized in Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping
a Post-Shelby County Contingency Strategy, 123 Yale L.J. Online 131, 137 (2013), http://
yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1172_7tflew4q.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7KM-U7CH] [hereinafter
Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Post-Shelby Contingency Strategy] (arguing preclearance "facili-
tates monitoring through disclosure" by "forc[ing] the institutions with the best information
about potential discriminatory practices to share that information").
50. For one such case study, see Ellen D. Katz, South Carolina's "Evolutionary Process,"
113 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 55, 58-61 (2013), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/03/Katz-113-Colum.-L-Rev.-Sidebar-55.pdf [http://perma.cc/4F4G-W
QYY] (concluding grant of preclearance of South Carolina's voter-ID law resulted from "evo-
lutionary process" of state officials addressing concerns regarding law's impact on minority
voters).
51. Regarding the enforcement function of More Information Requests, see Luis
Ricardo Fraga & Maria Lizet Ocampo, More Information Requests and the Deterrent
Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006:
Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power 47, 52-53, 65-67 (Anna Henderson
ed., 2007) (discussing procedural steps for More Information Requests and impact on
compliance).
52. See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the
Opt-In Approach, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 708, 725-26 (2006) (explaining DOJ initiates re-
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communities than others,53 but to the extent that DOJ cared about mi-
nority voting rights, the structure of section 5 made the path from "be-
coming concerned" to "blocking the change" easy and inexpensive to
navigate.
The contrast with section 2 could not be more dramatic: Section 2
disputes are adjudicated in judicial rather than administrative fora, the
legal standard for liability under section 2 is murky, and the burden of
proof falls on the party challenging the election law at issue rather than
the party defending it.5 4
Substantively, section 2 prohibits electoral arrangements "which re-
sult[]" in members of a class of citizens defined by race or color
"hav[ing] less opportunity than other members of the electorate to par-
ticipate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice."5 5 The courts have struggled to flesh out this abstraction. It is
generally agreed that plaintiffs must show (1) that the election law at is-
sue has a racially disparate impact and (2) that this impact can be
chalked up to the law's "interaction" with "social and historical condi-
tions."56 Most courts and commentators also agree that section 2 supports
independent causes of action for "vote denial" and "vote dilution.""
But these generalities conceal much normative uncertainty and disa-
greement. The ultimate question in section 2 cases is whether the "total-
ity of circumstances" warrant a finding of liability. 58 These "circum-
stances" include (but are not limited to) the defendant jurisdiction's his-
sponse to preclearance requests by placing "informal call ... to a civil rights group or an
elected minority official to see if there is a problem" with proposed restriction).
53. Some commentators have worried that partisan political considerations play an
excessive role in preclearance determinations, particularly for congressional and statewide
redistrictings. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim
of Its Own Success?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1730-31 (2004) (suggesting use of preclear-
ance for districting may permit partisan gain unlikely to be noticed or addressed). For
thoughtful replies to this line of critique, see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
The Politics of Preclearance, 12 Mich. J. Race & L. 513, 534-35 (2007) (arguing "ebbs and
flows of politics" are not "as noxious a development as some commentators believe" in
voting rights context); Ellen D. Katz, Democrats at DOJ: Why Partisan Use of the Voting
Rights Act Might Not Be So Bad After All, 23 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 415, 419-23 (2012) (sug-
gesting partisan use of VRA generates viable claims and responds to existing racial dis-
putes); Pitts, Let's Not Call the Whole Thing Off, supra note 48, at 630 ("Partisan in-
trigue ... does not constitute a compelling enough reason for section 5 to slip softly out of
existence.").
54. See Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, supra note 40, at 62-66 (sum-
marizing procedural differences between sections 2 and 5); id. at 74-86 (discussing sub-
stantive differences in vote-dilution context); id. at 106-10 (discussing substantive differ-
ences in vote-denial context).
55. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. 11 2015).
56. See infra section II.A (discussing requirements to show proof of section 2 violations).
57. As a reminder, denial cases concern barriers to the casting of valid, duly counted
ballots; dilution cases concern rules for aggregating votes into representation, such as
districted versus at-large elections. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
58. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,1017-18 (1994).
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tory of discrimination, lingering effects of past de jure discrimination,
racial appeals in political campaigns, racially polarized voting, informal
barriers to ballot access for minority candidates, unusual features of the
electoral system that may disadvantage minorities, and strength or weak-
ness of the state interests asserted in defense of the challenged election
laws.59
Still unresolved is the normative question to be answered when ex-
amining the totality of circumstances." In dilution cases, some courts
focus on whether the minority community can elect a "roughly propor-
tional" number of its candidates of choice. Other courts use the totality
of circumstances inquiry to assess whether the plaintiffs' injury can fairly
be traced to disparate-treatment or intentional race discrimination, wheth-
er by conventional state actors or nominally private actors.62 (This has
become known as the section 2 causation requirement.") And still other
59. These factors were enumerated in the Senate Judiciary Committee report accom-
panying passage of the section 2 results test. S. Rep. No. 97417, at 28-29 (1982).
60. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Kevin M. Quinn & Marisa A. Abrajano,
Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 36-50),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2668889 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting] (discussing four
theories of vote dilution and their conflicting implications).
61. This factor was prioritized-without being made decisive-by the Supreme Court
in De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1013-14 & n.11 ('Proportionality' as the term is used here links
the number of majority-minority voting districts to minority members' share of the rele-
vant population."). See generally Katz et al., supra note 30, at 730-32 (documenting lower
court reliance on this factor).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341, 349 (4th Cir. 2004)
("[T]he reason for polarized voting is a critical factor in the totality analysis .... "); Goosby
v. Town of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 502-03 (2d Cir. 1998) (Leval,J., concurring) ("[W]here
the complaint essentially alleges that voters of the protected class have had little success
electing candidates of their choice, and where correction would require radical political
restructuring .... I believe courts should not find a violation in the absence of race-based
intent."); Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d 600, 616 n.12 (4th Cir. 1996) ("We think the
best reading of the several opinions in Gingles ... is one that treats causation as irrelevant
in the inquiry into the . . . preconditions, but relevant in the totality of circumstances in-
quiry .... " (citations omitted)); S. Christian Leadership Conference of Ala. v. Sessions, 56
F.3d 1281, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[T]here was ample evidence in the record to sup-
port the [district] court's conclusion that factors other than [candidate] race, such as par-
ty politics and availability of qualified [black] candidates, were driving the election re-
sults .... "); Vecinos De Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 982-83 (1st Cir. 1995)
(explaining plaintiffs' showing of strong correlation between voter race and vote choice
gives rise to inference of racial bias on part of white electorate, which may be rebutted with
evidence "voting patterns can most logically be explained by factors unconnected to the
intersection of race with the electoral system"); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1523-25 (11th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (Tjoflat, C.J.) (adopting similar presumption and
burden-shifting rule); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v.
Clements, 989 F.2d 831, 849-63 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding white bloc voting
within meaning of third prong of Gingles is not "legally significant" unless "caused" by
race).
63. See D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 Harv. L.
Rev. 533, 590-97 (2008) [hereinafter Greiner, Causal Inference] (discussing courts' use of
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courts churn through the motions of the totality of circumstances analy-
sis without stopping to explain their underlying conception of equal po-
litical opportunity." In vote denial cases, the role of the totality of circum-
stances inquiry is, if anything, even more unsettled." The factors high-
lighted by Congress in enacting the results test were gleaned from earlier
vote dilution cases, and courts and commentators disagree about how (if
at all) they bear on vote denial cases.66 Problems of vote denial simply
were not part of the congressional debates.67
What is clear is that section 2's uncertain substantive norm, coupled
with its express call for a totality of circumstances inquiry, has made liti-
gating section 2 cases expensive and unpredictable. Plaintiffs must assem-
ble local election data and hire statisticians to estimate voting patterns.6 8
Historians may be called to speak to past practices in the locale. Candi-
dates, elected officials, and community leaders are asked to testify about
their personal experiences with bloc voting, racial campaign appeals, and
the like." The causation inquiry further complicates matters. Plaintiffs
challenging a felon disenfranchisement rule, for example, may have to
prove that the state's penal code is administered in an intentionally dis-
criminatory fashion.70 Worse yet, as Jim Greiner has explained, the causa-
causation element when adjudicating section 2 cases); Katz et al., supra note 30, at 670-72
(discussing case law). As Greiner and Katz observe, some courts roll the "causation issue"
into the Gingles polarized-voting inquiry, and others consider it part of the "totality of cir-
cumstances." Katz suggests-we think correctly-that little turns on this distinction. Id. at
671.
64. See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript at 37)
("Most judicial opinions in vote dilution cases are nominally atheoretical.").
65. Cf. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th
Cir. 2014) ("[T]here is a paucity of appellate case law evaluating the merits of Section 2
claims in the vote-denial context."). Compare Tokaji, supra note 29, at 709-26 (arguing
most of Senate Report factors are not relevant to vote denial cases), with Veasey v. Perry, 29
F. Supp. 3d 896, 918-19 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (relying on Senate Report factors in case about
voter-ID requirement).
66. See supra note 65.
67. See Thomas M. Boyd & Stephan J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1356-425 (1983) (re-
counting legislative history, which was entirely focused on vote dilution).
68. For local government elections, these data are rarely available in convenient elec-
tronic formats and assembling the data is often a significant cost in section 2 litigation. See
infra text accompanying note 157.
69. On the importance of qualitative evidence for vote dilution litigation under
section 2, see Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 48 ("Anecdotal evidence is
often used [in Section 2 cases] to supplement statistical findings."); D. James Greiner, Re-
Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and Legal Doctrine in the Melting Pot, 86 Ind.
L.J. 447, 484-87 (2011) [hereinafter Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting] (discuss-
ing types of qualitative evidence that can help judges make inferences about racial
polarization).
70. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting chal-
lenge to Washington State's felony disenfranchisement rule on ground that plaintiff failed
to establish intentional discrimination in criminal justice administration).
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tion question has often been posed in ways that may render it
unanswerable."
Together, the fact-intensive nature of section 2 claims and the uncer-
tain standard for liability make preliminary relief hard to obtain. Veteran
litigators estimate that plaintiffs have secured preliminary injunctions in
only about 5% of section 2 cases.72 The path from "becoming concerned"
to "blocking a change" is slow and arduous. Meanwhile, officials elected
under racially discriminatory ground rules may pass new laws that further
hinder minority candidates or otherwise disadvantage the minority
community.
To say that section 2 pales in comparison to section 5 is not to say
that it is toothless. There has emerged a nascent ecosystem of civil rights
groups that monitor state and local governments and have some in-house
capacity for litigation. 3 Also, well-funded actors such as political parties
and unions sometimes finance section 2 cases when the political stakes
are high, for example, when the litigation could shift the balance of pow-
er in a state legislature or in Congress. However, the section 2 results
test is under threat from two directions-one jurisprudential, the other
demographic and statistical.
B. Looming Threats to Section 2
The Supreme Court has issued a string of decisions narrowing sec-
tion 2 on the basis of the constitutional avoidance canon.75 Shelby County
provides an accelerant, as the Court's rejection ofJim Crow history as the
rationale for section 5 coverage casts doubt on the common judicial prac-
tice of grounding section 2 "social and historical conditions" findings on
the same history.76 More generally, the normative uncertainty at the heart
of section 2 makes it difficult to assess whether the results test represents
a congruent and proportional response to constitutional violations.7
The other rising threat to section 2 is that the statistical techniques
used to establish minority political cohesion and white bloc voting tend
to break down if there are more than two racial groups or significant res-
71. Greiner, Causal Inference, supra note 63, at 591-97.
72. Hebert & Derfner, supra note 7.
73. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Post-Shelby Contingency Strategy, supra note 49, at
123-24 (describing litigation efforts of civic groups under section 5).
74. Samuel Issacharoff has argued that political parties and associated actors typically
have the most to gain in section 2 cases. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and
Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 646 (2002) (describing "clear partisan gain" for
political parties in redistricting litigation).
75. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 399-404 (summariz-
ing cases).
76. See infra section II.A (describing threshold for section 2 relief after Shelby
County).
77. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 409-14 (evaluating and
contrasting competing normative understandings of section 2).
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idential integration in the jurisdiction-which is increasingly typical. Mi-
nority cohesion and white-bloc voting have traditionally been inferred
from aggregate rather than individual-level data (precinct-level election
returns plus racial demographics from the Census).78 This works reasona-
bly well when there are only two racial groups and precincts are racially
homogenous. But as the number of racial groups increases from two to
three or four, and as neighborhoods become less homogeneous, the
amount of information about racial voting patterns in the precinct-level
data becomes very sparse.79 Conclusions about racial polarization under
these conditions are tenuous-unless the analyst can supplement the ag-
gregate data with individual-level observations obtained from exit polls
and other surveys.80 But survey data about vote choice in local elections
"are almost never available" in vote dilution cases.81
Courts may well start to reject section 2 claims on the ground that
the evidence of racially polarized voting is unreliable. Would-be plaintiffs
who suspect a section 2 violation may have to wait several election cycles
before bringing suit, pouring money into exit polls all the while.82
II. MAKING IT WORK: PRESUMPTIONS FOR THE CORE OF SECTION 2
Having set up the problem, we now elaborate our solution. The ar-
gument proceeds in three steps. The first step, which this Part develops,
is to explain how central factual questions on which section 2 liability
turns could, in principle, be translated into rebuttable evidentiary pre-
sumptions, implemented cheaply and predictably using national survey
78. For a great introduction to the statistical techniques used in vote dilution cases,
see D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We
Now, and Where Do We Want to Be?, 47 Jurimetrics 115, 123-50 (2007) [hereinafter
Greiner, Ecological Inference].
79. See D. James Greiner & Kevin M. Quinn, Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting:
Combining Individual-Level and RxC Ecological Data, 4 Annals Applied Stats. 1774, 1776
(2010) [hereinafter Greiner & Quinn, Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting] (describing
challenges to modeling voting patterns as diversity increases); Greiner, Re-Solidifying
Racial Bloc Voting, supra note 69, at 465-68 ("[M]ore racial groups mean more moving
parts.").
80. See Adam Glynn & Jon Wakefield, Ecological Inference in the Social Sciences, 7
Stat. Method. 307, 307 (2010) (demonstrating "inclusion of a small amount of individual
level data can dramatically improve the properties of [the] estimates"); Greiner & Quinn,
Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting, supra note 79, at 1777 ("[O]ur hybrid estimator al-
lows inferences unavailable from either the exit poll or the ecological inference model
alone.").
81. Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights
Case Law, in Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective 197,
217 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
82. Greiner treats this as an unavoidable consequence of his results. See Greiner, Re-
Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting, supra note 69, at 482 ("The need for polls over several elec-
tion cycles may be a fact of life in some multiracial polities.").
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data and standard statistical models.83 After establishing that the core of
section 2 can be translated into such presumptions, we will address judi-
cial authority to create the presumptions (Part III) and statistical tools
for estimating local opinion using national surveys (Part IV).
Where the presumptions apply, defendants would have to rebut the
inference of a statutory violation, much like state and local governments
in preclearance proceedings under section 5 carried the burden of
proof. Section 2 would therefore become information forcing in much
the same way as section 5. And, assuming that the presumptions apply
predictably and at low cost, it will be easy for civil rights groups and po-
tential defendants to figure out ex ante who is likely to bear the burden
of proof (and on which questions) in a section 2 case.84 Potential defend-
ants that are "covered" de facto by the presumptions would know this,
and, like jurisdictions that were covered de jure under the preclearance
regime, would have incentives to anticipate and mitigate potential dis-
parate impacts whenever they change their election laws.85 If they do not,
plaintiffs should be able to obtain preliminary relief, even preimplemen-
tation, as the presumptions would go a long distance toward establishing
the necessary "likelihood of success on the merits."
The use of national survey data and standard statistical models is
very important for low-cost, predictable implementation. Instead of gath-
ering case-specific datasets, prospective litigants should be able to go
online, download the relevant dataset and statistical model, and figure
out which presumptions apply. Because the same datasets and models would
be used in case after case, each judicial decision would provide consid-
erable guidance about the next case. This is not true of section 2 today
because the cases tend to be litigated on the basis of voting patterns in
local elections.6 The candidates and issues in these elections vary from
83. National surveys rarely ask about vote choice in local elections. And even if the
survey did ask about local elections, the new statistical tools for estimating local opinion
from national surveys (explained in Part IV) could not be used to estimate vote choice in
local elections. The tools assume that all survey respondents have answered the same question.
84. Though not quite so easy as looking up the jurisdiction's name on the list of cov-
ered jurisdictions under section 5.
85. In one important respect, a presumption-driven section 2 would actually be more
powerful than erstwhile section 5. Under section 5, state and local governments were
never liable for leaving in place existing laws with a racially disparate impact; only changes
to the jurisdiction's electoral arrangements could be challenged on an "impact" (rather
than intent) theory. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (Supp. II 2015) (applying when covered
jurisdiction "shall enact or seek to administer" new voting restriction). By contrast, the
results test of section 2 allows status-quo arrangements to be challenged. 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(b).
86. "Polarized voting" is the central issue in vote dilution cases, see Elmendorf et al.,
Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript at 8-15) (reviewing evolution of ra-
cial polarization "test"), and one factor among many that courts may consider in vote de-
nial cases, see Christopher Elmendorf, Judge Easterbrook on the Voting Rights Act: Asking
Good Questions, Making Bad Law, Election Law at Moritz (Oct. 8, 2014), http://moritz
law.osu.edu/election-law/article/?article=12965 [http://perma.cc/P8YG-VM3Z] (noting
2160 [Vol. 115:2143
SECTION 2 AFTER SHELBY COUNTY
one jurisdiction to the next, so a court's determination in one case about,
for example, what constitutes a "legally significant" level of polarized vot-
ing generally does not carry over to the next case.87
This argument comes with an important caveat. The benefits of im-
plementing section 2 with rebuttable presumptions and national survey
data-lower cost and more predictable litigation, with preliminary relief
becoming easier to secure in parts of the country where the likelihood of
racial discrimination with respect to voting is high-depend on wide-
spread agreement about what the presumptions are and how they apply
in a given case. But widespread agreement may be hard to achieve. The
courts are not of one mind about the meaning of section 2,88 and even
conditional on a particular gloss on section 2's meaning, the presump-
tions could be defined in a variety of ways.89 In addition, estimating local
opinion from national survey data depends on various discretionary mod-
eling choices, inviting "battles of the experts" even if the courts have
reached agreement on how to define the presumptions.90
Guidance from an administrative agency such as DOJ may be neces-
sary to solve the judicial coordination problem.9' For now, it is enough to
show that important factual questions on which section 2 liability de-
pends can, in principle, be answered using rebuttable presumptions and
national survey data.
The argument of this Part unfolds as follows. Section II.A presents a
Shelby County-informed gloss on the central elements of a section 2 claim.
It argues that plaintiffs must show (1) that the challenged practice has a ra-
cially disparate impact (the "disparate impact prong") and (2) that the rem-
edy sought is a reasonable response to recent, unconstitutional race dis-
crimination or the present and future risk of unconstitutional race dis-
crimination in the defendantjurisdiction (the "constitutional risk prong").
racially polarized voting is important in vote denial cases due to consideration of social
and historical conditions). Evidence of racial polarization or its absence in so-called "en-
dogenous" elections-elections to the governmental body at issue in the case-typically re-
ceives the most weight. Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manu-
script at 25).
87. For a detailed examination of how the racially polarized voting inquiry works in
practice today, see Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript
at 15-35).
88. See generally Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 386-403
(describing Supreme Court's "ongoing uncertainty about the meaning of Section 2, the
Court's worries about the effects of Section 2 on racial politics, and the Court's doubts
about the constitutionality of Section 2"); Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting,
supra note 60 (manuscript at 36-49) (summarizing federal judges' "competing normative
theories" in vote dilution cases).
89. See infra sections II.B-II.C (suggesting evidentiary presumptions).
90. See infra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary showings for
crafting rebuttable presumptions for section 2).
91. See infra notes 222-231 and accompanying text (suggesting possibility of greater
DOJ action to limit judicial discretion in setting presumptions).
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Section II.B suggests that the constitutional risk prong can be satisfied with
evidence of racial stereotyping in the defendant jurisdiction or possibly with
evidence of an extreme correlation between race and reliable partisan vot-
ing. Section II.C sketches out some tentative presumptions for the disparate-
impact prong, focusing on electoral district demographics (for dilution cases),
and racial gaps in voter participation rates as well as impacts by socioeco-
nomic class (for denial cases).
A. Preliminaries: Interpreting Section 2 in Constitutional Context (After
Shelby County)
In order to translate the core factual questions under section 2 into
evidentiary presumptions, one must first establish what those questions
are and whether there are specific legal constraints that the presump-
tions must respect. These questions are tricky. As noted above, the statu-
tory text is opaque and the evolving case law has not created much nor-
mative clarity.92
Ours is a practical project, so rather than begin with some idealized
account of section 2, we begin with an account that we think a broad
range of judges could accept-including those in the center of the cur-
rent Supreme Court. The Court has repeatedly signaled its discomfort
with section 2, often using the constitutional avoidance canon to justify
narrow constructions." The constitutional problem in a nutshell is this:
Section 2 establishes a results test, but the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments prohibit only subjective discrimination" on the basis of
race.9 5 Though the Supreme Court has stated that Congress, when en-
forcing the Fourteenth Amendment, may prohibit some conduct that
92. See generally Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 387-95
("There is certainly no plain meaning to this statutory standard, and the legislative history
is opaque in critical respects.").
93. Id. at 379-403.
94. A terminological note: The term "subjective discrimination" is used here as a
catchall for intentional and disparate-treatment discrimination. Though the terms "inten-
tional discrimination" and "disparate treatment discrimination" are sometimes used inter-
changeably by the courts, disparate treatment-treating person A differently than person
B because of A's race-need not be intentional. It may result from biases or preferences of
which the decisionmaker is unaware. See generally Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94
Calif. L. Rev. 945 (2006) (covering various forms of implicit bias in human behavior and
intersection with law). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015), strongly signals that even unintended disparate treatment on the basis of race
generally violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact
and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive
Communities, 101 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting Court "referred not just to 'disguised animus' but also to
'unconscious prejudices'" in describing discriminatory intent uncovered by disparate im-
pact doctrine (quoting Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522)).
95. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 399-403 (describing
how constitutional concerns facilitate narrow reading of section 2 by conservative justices).
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does not violate the Constitution, the Court has imposed a tailoring re-
quirement: Enforcement measures must be "congruent and propor-
tional" to the record or threat of constitutional violations.96 It is doubtful
that a pure disparate-impact standard could satisfy this requirement.97
But plaintiffs in a section 2 case must show more than disparate im-
pact. Rather, as many courts have stated, plaintiffs must establish not only
(1) that the challenged election law, procedure, or practice has a racially
disparate impact on the minority's opportunity to participate in the polit-
ical process (in vote denial cases) or to elect representatives of its choice
(in vote dilution cases) but also (2) that this disparate impact can be
chalked up to the "interact[ion]" of the challenged provisions with "so-
cial and historical conditions."98
The answer to those who doubt section 2's constitutionality lies in
the murky "social and historical conditions" requirement. It should be
interpreted to maintain a nexus between liability under the statutory re-
sults test and actual or threatened constitutional violations. The showing
ought to establish that unconstitutional race discrimination in the elec-
toral process is at least "significantly likely" to occur or to have occurred
in the defendant jurisdiction and that the remedy the plaintiff seeks is a
reasonable response to the risk of constitutional violations.99 To avoid
confusion, we suggest relabeling the "social and historical conditions re-
quirement" as the "constitutional risk requirement."
In an important sense, the "social and historical conditions" or "con-
stitutional risk" showing is section 2's counterpart to the coverage for-
mula for section 5. Because the coverage formula for section 5 tracked
historical, unconstitutional race discrimination,'00 preclearance could be
denied on the basis of retrogressive impact alone, without any further show-
ing to establish a nexus between the remedy-denial of preclearance-
and constitutional violations (at least until the coverage formula began to
seem dated). But because section 2 applies nationally and thus to many
state and local governments with no history of entrenched, de jure race
discrimination, it is necessary for plaintiffs to make a further, case-specific
96. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
97. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 400-01 (claiming ra-
cially disproportionate election outcomes alone may not justify application of section 2 as
"congruent and proportional" under Boerne).
98. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.); see
also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F3d 224, 239 (4th Cir. 2014)
(extending this idea to vote denial claims); Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768
F.3d 524, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2014) (same).
99. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 417-47 (stating
plaintiffs in section 2 cases must show significant likelihood of link between injury and
"race-biased decisionmaking").
100. Technically, the coverage formula used proxies: low rates of voter participation and
the use of "tests or devices" to disqualify voters. But the formula was reverse engineered to
cover most of the Jim Crow South. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329-30
(1966) (describing coverage formula and its purpose).
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showing that judicial intervention to remedy the racial disparity is
justified.
A few caveats are in order. There is no settled judicial understanding
of the "social and historical conditions" requirement in section 2 cases.
Some judges have said it simply corroborates that the racially disparate im-
pact "is not merely a product of chance."'
0' So understood, the "social
and historical conditions" showing need not say anything about the nex-
us between the remedy the plaintiffs seek and the risk of constitutional
violations. Indeed, in most cases the showing would be redundant with
the evidence of disparate impact. The impacts with which section 2 is con-
cerned (minority representation and minority voter participation) result
from the "interaction" of the challenged measure with large numbers of
people (voters or potential voters and candidates or potential candidates),
usually across a substantial number of elections. 1
2 Under such condi-
tions, large racial disparities are very unlikely to occur due to chance
alone.103 A showing of racially disparate impact will in most cases estab-
lish by implication that there exists some set of race-correlated "social con-
ditions" (e.g., wealth, education, employment, political interest, church
attendance, car ownership, newspaper readership, etc.) that account for
the disparity.
In point of fact, however, most courts addressing "social and histori-
cal conditions" in a section 2 case focus not on socioeconomics generally,
but rather on subjective race discrimination and its legacy-precisely
what the courts ought to focus on if the purpose of the showing is to
identify risk factors for unconstitutional race discrimination in the elec-
toral process.'04 Typical considerations include Jim Crow history, housing
101. E.g., Frank v. Walker, 17F. Supp. 3d 837, 876-77 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd on other
grounds, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). This also seems to have been the understanding of
the plurality in Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, which tried to boil vote dilution law down to the sim-
ple question of whether minority-preferred candidates were almost always defeated. See id.
at 46-51 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.).
102. For example, the measurement of impact may factor elections over several cycles
for every seat in a legislative chamber or congressional delegation. Cf. League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 436-37 (2006) (holding "proportionality" in section 2
challenge to statewide redistricting is to be assessed on statewide basis).
103. This follows from a statistical theorem called the "law of averages" or "law of large
numbers." For an introduction, see David Freedman et al., Statistics 273-84 (4th ed. 2007)
(providing mathematical explanations and exercises to demonstrate law of averages).
104. Many such factors were laid out in an influential Senate Committee report (al-
though not characterized by the Committee as "risk factors" for constitutional violations).
See Katz et al., supra note 30, at 648-50 ("The Senate Report identified several factors,
now known as 'the Senate Factors,' for courts to use when assessing whether a particular
practice or procedure results in prohibited discrimination in violation of Section 2."). For
a particularly clear judicial statement interpreting the social-and-historical-conditions re-
quirement much as we suggest, see League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina,
769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) ("[The] burden must in part be caused by or linked to
social and historical conditions that have or currently produce discrimination against members
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segregation, racially polarized voting (often assumed to manifest discrim-
ination against minority candidates), public and private discrimination in
employment and education, racial campaign appeals, etc.105 These are
risk factors for unconstitutional state action in the electoral process inso-
far as they bespeak a world in which race discrimination is pervasive.
Some courts go further and expressly read section 2 as requiring
proof of race-discriminatory "causation"-evidence that the injury for
which plaintiffs seek redress resulted from subjective discrimination by
conventional state actors or by voters.106 On the particulars of this causa-
tion requirement, the courts are all over the map. Some courts say it is a
necessary element of a section 2 case.107 Others say it is just one factor
among many to be weighed.108 Some courts seem to infer causation from
of the protected class." (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
105. See generally Katz et al., supra note 30, at 661-730 (discussing judicial treatment
of "Senate Report" factors). For recent exemplars, see, e.g., League of Women Voters, 769
F.3d at 238-47 (emphasizing history of discrimination); Ohio State Conference of NAACP
v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 556-59 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing discrimination in education
and employment as well as in electoral process).
106. See generally Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 57-58 ("[A] num-
ber of courts have held that a plaintiff cannot win a Section 2 case where racially polarized
voting is caused by reasons other than racial animus."); Greiner, Causal Inference, supra
note 63, at 590-97 (stating "prevailing view" is that "section 2 does contemplate ... causal
inquiry"); Katz et al., supra note 30, at 670-73 ("Courts in nine judicial circuits now ex-
pressly or implicitly incorporate causation."). For a rare exception, see United States v.
Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 912 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Requiring proof of discriminatory mo-
tives among white voters in Blaine County would be divisive and would place an impossible
burden on the plaintiffs.").
107. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d
586, 595 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring section 2 plaintiffs to demonstrate causal connection
between challenged voting practice and prohibited discriminatory result); Uno v. City of
Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[T]he ultimate burden of persuading the fact-
finder that the voting patterns were engendered by race rests with the plaintiffs."); S.
Christian Leadership Conference of Ala. v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1292 (11th Cir. 1995)
(finding lack of "discriminatory purposes" in place requirements and lack of "discrimina-
tory intent" in size ofjudicial election districts); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515 (11th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (Tjoflat, C.J.) ("[I]f the evidence shows ... that
the community is not motivated by racial bias in its voting patterns, then a case of vote
dilution has not been made."); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v.
Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 862 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) ("[A]n inquiry into the causes un-
derlying polarized voting is appropriate .... "); Mallory v. Ohio, 38 E Supp. 2d 525, 575-76
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (stating plaintiffs must prove "'deprivation of the minority group's right
to equal participation must be on account of a classification, decision, or practice that
depends on race or color' (quoting Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1515)), aff'd, 173 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.
1999).
108. See, e.g., Goosby v. Town of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 493-503 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding causation is relevant factor to be considered in totality of the circumstances in-
quiry); see also Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1008-38 (D.S.D. 2004) (rec-
ognizing causation "may be relevant" at totality of circumstances stage of section 2 case).
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Jim Crow history.109 Others insist on evidence that current voting patterns
or actions by government officials manifest subjective discrimination
against minority candidates.0 Still other courts rebuttably presume sub-
jective race discrimination from racially polarized voting in biracial elec-
tions."' Judicial treatment of the section 2 causation "requirement" is so
varied and inconsistent that leading scholars don't even agree whether
the requirement has practical bite. Ellen Katz characterizes it as a signifi-
cant barrier to section 2 claims.1 2 Jim Greiner thinks it is a nominal re-
quirement only, regularly ignored in practice."3
109. See, e.g., Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 405 (5th
Cir. 1991) (affirming district court finding of section 2 violation based on disparity in voter
registration rates "coupled with a history of discriminatory voter registration procedures").
For additional discussion and examples, see Katz et al., supra note 30, at 675-77 (describ-
ing courts' findings about the "nature, frequency, and recentness" of discrimination). To
be clear, the courts in such cases are not necessarily asserting that the history means that
racially polarized voting (or a particular state action) has been "caused" by racial discrimi-
nation. Rather, their position seems to be that the history establishes a "totality of circum-
stances" connection between present-day disparate impacts and intentional discrimination
by state actors.
110. See, e.g., Uno, 72 F.3d at 983 ("If proven, these preconditions give rise to an in-
ference that racial bias is operating through the medium of the targeted electoral struc-
ture to impair minority political opportunities.").
111. See, e.g., Goosby, 180 F.3d at 502-03 (Leval, J., concurring) ("Proof of [Gingles]
factors sufficiently supports an inference that race may have been a motivating factor to
justify imposing on defendants the burden to prove that the regular defeat of minority
preferred candidates is not the result of race-based intent. . . ."); Milwaukee Branch of the
NAACP v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Proving discriminatory intent
is not part of the plaintiffs' case under § 2."); Uno, 72 F.3d at 983 ("The resultant inference
is not immutable, but it is strong; it will endure unless and until the defendant adduces
credible evidence tending to prove that detected voting patterns can most logically be
explained by factors unconnected to the intersection of race with the electoral system.").
The rebuttable presumption is also present, though more implicit, in circuits where "cau-
sation" is considered at the totality of circumstances stage (rather than as part of the Gingles
inquiry into bloc voting) and the Gingles factors are collectively regarded as establishing a
presumption of liability. See, e.g., Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding plaintiffs need not prove "causal connection" between past discrimination and
depressed minority participation); Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4
F.3d 1103, 1135 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding district court must "explain with particularity"
finding for defendant in section 2 case where "white voters voting as a bloc ... defeat the
candidate of choice of a politically cohesive minority group"); see also NAACP v. City of
Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1019 n.21 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1135); Clark
v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (same).
112. Katz et al., supra note 30, at 671-72 & n.145 (citing thirteen cases and noting
"[p]roving the linkage is difficult ... and numerous lawsuits have held that plaintiffs failed
to meet their burden .. . on this point").
113. Greiner, Causal Inference, supra note 63, at 591 ("[T]he causal inquiry ... ap-
pears to matter little in actual cases unless the factual record demonstrates that candidates
of minority race have enjoyed some measure of electoral success."); Greiner, Re-Solidifying
Racial Bloc Voting, supra note 69, at 459-60 (characterizing current burden-shifting prac-
tices as depriving causation requirement of practical bite).
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In any event, our aim is not to extract from the case law some major-
ity or plurality view of the causation or social-and-historical-conditions
requirement. Rather, the intention is to gloss it in a manner that a broad
range of judges could accept, including those-such as the median
Justice on the current Supreme Court-who are leery of equalizing, race-
conscious state action except as a remedy for subjective race discrimina-
tion. As noted above1 4 and explained at length elsewhere, the "risk fac-
tors" interpretation effectively reconciles the results test of section 2 with
the jurisprudential premises of the conservative center.1 5 The point of
the showing is to establish that the relief the plaintiff seeks is reasonably
well tailored to remedy or prevent constitutional violations. Plaintiffs
need not prove that constitutional violations in fact occurred, or that
they necessarily will occur in the future. But plaintiffs must establish a
significant likelihood or risk of unconstitutional race discrimination in the
electoral process. Accordingly, this Article will refer to this element of the
plaintiff's case not as the "social and historical conditions" requirement
or the "causation" requirement, but rather as the "constitutional risk" or
"risk factors" requirement.
One might suppose that constitutional risk could be established, at
least in the Deep South, merely by invoking Jim Crow history. Remedies
under section 2 can certainly be characterized as remedying the linger-
ing effects of generations of unchecked discriminatory state action in the
South."6 Numerous lower courts have in fact emphasized Jim Crow his-
tory as part of the "social and historical conditions" inquiry." But in
Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court denied the legitimacy of his-
tory as a basis for subjecting state and local governments to preclearance
under section 5.118 Shelby County asks instead for evidence of current race
discrimination, not historical discrimination; the Court was unwilling to
assume that state and local governments that engaged in de jure discrim-
ination half a century ago are today more likely than other subnational
114. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (noting "social and historical
conditions" requirement may maintain nexus between liability under results test and ac-
tual or threatened constitutional violations).
115. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 417-47 (developing
interpretation of section 2 grounded in statute's "legislative history and constitutional
context").
116. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights
and Remedies After Flores, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 725, 738-40 (1998) (discussing reme-
dies to racial bloc voting that "dampen the present effects of ... past external
discrimination").
117. See Katz et al., supra note 30, at 676 (noting "[m]any courts" evaluating social
and historical conditions discussed discrimination from nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, including "literacy tests, grandfather clauses, poll taxes, white primaries, .. .
voter registration requirements, . .. [and] state laws mandating segregation").
118. See Joel Heller, Shelby County and the End of History, 44 U. Mem. L. Rev. 357,
359-60 (2013) (noting Court's rejection of section 5 formula relying on historical data);
see also Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) (holding Congress "cannot
rely simply on the past" and must use "current data" for coverage formula).
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political units to discriminate unconstitutionally.
19 Shelby County is of a
piece with many other Supreme Court decisions setting time limits on
remedies for past de jure discrimination.2 1 It is therefore doubtful that
the Court will treat purely historical evidence as sufficient to establish a
current risk of constitutional violations in section 2 cases. And it is
equally unlikely that the Court will view results-oriented remedies under
section 2 as a "congruent" response to constitutional violations that took
place long ago.'2 '
Plaintiffs will be on much stronger ground if they can make the con-
stitutional risk showing using current data, focusing on the present-day risk
of unconstitutional race discrimination in the electoral process. History
must be downplayed. Working from these premises, the balance of this
Part sketches a set of rebuttable presumptions that could be used to im-
plement the constitutional-risk and disparate-impact prongs of section 2.
B. Presumptions About "Risk Factors"for Constitutional Violations
The essential ingredients for a workable showing of "constitutional
risk" under section 2 are a facially convincing theory about risk factors
for unconstitutional race discrimination and an empirical method for
ascertaining the relative severity of those risk factors across jurisdictions
using current data. The theory has to be facially convincing because the
relevant constitutional violations are difficult to observe. Social scientists
can track outcomes-minority registration and turnout, the election of
minority candidates, etc.-but as presently interpreted, the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments are indifferent to outcomes as such. What
makes a racially disparate outcome unconstitutional is not the extent of
the disparity but whether it results from subjective discrimination, and
such discrimination is hard to detect.
Accordingly, this section suggests a pair of constitutional risk pre-
sumptions that speak to motive and propensities for disparate treatment.
119. 133 S. Ct. at 2625-31.
120. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) ("From the very first,
federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy
past discrimination."). As Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee observe, "The basic position of
the Court during the past 16 years has been that the constitutional violations arising from
a history of segregation and inequality, when proved, justify race conscious remedies but
only for a limited time." Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Historic Reversals, Accelerating
Resegregation, and the Need for New Integration Strategies, Report of the Civil Rights
Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles, UCLA 7 (2007), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/
k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-
the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6G5B-GG85]; cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today.").
121. Cf. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2624-29 (recounting "dramatic[]" improvements
in minority political participation in South over last fifty years); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009) ("Things have changed in the South.").
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One is grounded on current racial attitudes, the other on elected offi-
cials' incentive to use race as a screening device to effectuate political
discrimination.'2 2
1. Racial Attitudes and Beliefs. 1 2 - There may be no surer proposi-
tion in constitutional law than that state action motivated by racial stereo-
types or racial animus offends the Equal Protection Clause. In jurisdic-
tions where majority-group voters subscribe to exceptionally dim views of
a minority group, it is reasonable to presume that the regular defeat of
minority candidates is due at least in part to constitutionally prohibited
motives. It is also plausible to suppose that in these communities, the adop-
tion or maintenance of electoral arrangements that disadvantage minori-
ties tends to occur in part because of motives or beliefs that the Constitution
disallows as the basis for state action. Locally elected officials are selected
from and by the residents, and if majority-race residents denigrate the
minority, these officials will probably be rewarded (or at least not pun-
ished) at the ballot box if they suppress minority political participation or
representation. 121
To be sure, it doesn't follow from the existence of negative racial atti-
tudes on the part of the white majority that minority candidates or mi-
nority voters will in fact suffer disparate-treatment discrimination. In-
deed, the question of whether racial attitudes "cause" disparate treat-
ment is, for methodological purists, unanswerable. Like her race itself,1 2 5
a person's racial attitudes cannot be manipulated by researchers, and
without manipulation of the supposed "cause" there is no way to deter-
mine with certainty the effects of that cause.126 Moreover, whatever "treat-
ments" (life experiences) may cause the development of racial stereo-
types probably cause many other things as well. So even if a treatment
were shown to cause both the development of negative stereotypes of
minorities and a reluctance to vote for minority candidates, it would not
122. These are not the only plausible options. It may also be feasible to estimate geo-
graphic variation in disparate treatment of minority-race candidates using survey experi-
ments. See Marisa A. Abrajano, Christopher S. Elmendorf & Kevin M. Quinn, Using
Experiments to Estimate Racially Polarized Voting 27-35 (Univ. Cal. Davis Legal Studies
Research Paper, No. 419, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=256
9982 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Abrajano et al., Using Experiments]
(demonstrating technical feasibility of experiment with non-representative sample survey).
123. Portions of this section previously appeared in Elmendorf & Spencer, Preclearance,
supra note 19, at 1137-38.
124. Note also that vote dilution remedies can be conceptualized as a response to un-
constitutional state action by the electorate, see Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra
note 23, at 430-47.
125. See D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable
Characteristics, 93 Rev. of Econ. & Stat. 775, 776 (2011) ("[A]ttributes are not subject to
change by intervention.").
126. See id. at 775 (noting impossibility of manipulating immutable traits "in a way
analogous to administering a treatment in a randomized experiment"). On the centrality
of manipulation/randomization to causal inference, see Joshua D. Angrist & J6rn-Steffen
Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion 5 (2008).
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be clear that the negative stereotypes were responsible for the subject's
lack of support for minority candidates.1 2 7
But these fine points about causal inference miss a more basic social
reality: Racial attitudes are conventionally understood to motivate behav-
ior. Bigots would not be castigated if bigotry were believed to be merely a
set of attitudes unconnected to behavior. Law is a practical endeavor.
Sometimes a social convention about causation is enough.12
8 Subject to
two provisos, the "constitutional risk" element of a section 2 claim can be
deemed (presumptively) satisfied if plaintiffs show that majority-race citi-
zens harbor negative attitudes about the minority.29
The first proviso is that the measure of racial attitudes must correlate with
political behavior or preferences among white (majority-race) voters.
3
3 Section 2
127. In all social science applications, the barriers to inference about causal pathways
tend to be formidable. See Donald P. Green, Shang E. Ha & John G. Bullock, Enough
Already About Black Box Experiments: Studying Mediation Is More Difficult than Most
Scholars Suppose, 628 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 200, 200 (2010) (arguing statisti-
cal methods used to study mediation are flawed and require strong assumptions to answer
questions).
128. As Justice Souter once observed about constitutional judicial review, "The quan-
tum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judg-
ments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000). Consider also the torts doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which clearly rests on generally shared beliefs (rather than data) about
how things work in the world. See Jane Stapleton, Law, Causation, and Common Sense, 8
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 111, 112 (1988) (reviewing H.L.A. Hart's work on role of "common
sense" in legal treatments of causation).
129. Note that although conservative judges have generally rejected the idea that there
is a compelling interest in remedying societal discrimination, Congress's power to remedy
societal discrimination may be considerably greater when such discrimination proximately
affects voting and election outcomes. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra
note 23, at 430-36 (arguing electorate as a whole is state actor when it performs "public
function" of putting in office officials who exercise coercive power of state); Ellen D. Katz,
Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2341, 2355-60 (2003)
(noting Waite Court left room for Congress to attack race discrimination insofar as it pre-
vented blacks from voting). Notably, the conservative judges who have read a race-discriminatory
"causation" requirement into section 2 have accepted that race discrimination by the elec-
torate furnishes the necessary causal link. See, e.g., Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515-24
(11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (Tjoflat, C.J.) (concluding plaintiff may prove
discrimination by showing "objective factors that, under the totality of the circumstances,
show the exclusion of the minority group from meaningful access to the political process due
to the interaction of racial bias in the community with the challenged voting scheme");
League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 862 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (stating plaintiffs' causation requirement satisfied by showing "failure
to elect representatives of their choice is attributable to white bloc voting rooted in racial
considerations").
130. Plaintiffs might satisfy this proviso by showing that more prejudiced whites (per
the plaintiffs' measure of prejudice) are less supportive than other whites of minority candi-
dates compared to similar white candidates, or less supportive of certain policies when the
policy beneficiaries are portrayed as plaintiff-race rather than white. The necessary show-
ing could be made with observational or experimental data. Of course, the showing will not
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is ultimately concerned with equal political opportunity.'3' If whites' racial
attitudes do not correlate with political behavior, there is little ground for
presuming that minority-preferred candidates or policies would have fared
better but for white prejudice. By contrast, if whites' racial attitudes are
strongly associated with, for example, white support for minority-race can-
didates, it makes sense to guard against the risk of discrimination even if
the causal effect of racial attitudes on vote choice cannot be established.
Just as a strong correlation between cholesterol levels or obesity, on the
one hand, and heart disease, on the other, would justify some precaution-
ary medical or dietary interventions, so too may correlational evidence
justify legal interventions.32
The second proviso is that the racial-attitude measure must capture an at-
titude or belief that the Constitution disallows as the basis for state action. Many
political scientists have sought to quantify what they call "racial resent-
ment" or "modern" racism, using survey questions that ask about support
for federal welfare programs, affirmative action, and interventions by the
"government in Washington" to improve the social and economic welfare
of blacks.13 Racists no doubt give predictable answers to these questions,
but there is nothing unconstitutional about predicating state action on
the belief that federal welfare programs are a waste of money, or the view
that affirmative action and efforts by the "government in Washington" to
improve the welfare of blacks have been counterproductive. Because of
this, it is tenuous to infer a likelihood of unconstitutional race discrim-
ination from the prevalence of "racial resentment."
However, as we have shown elsewhere, conventional survey-based
measures of racial stereotyping, which tap perceptions of racial differences
in work ethic, intelligence, and trustworthiness, easily satisfy both of the
be causal in that racial attitudes themselves cannot be randomized. The showing would be cor-
relational and therefore suggestive only. In section IV.B, infra, we satisfy the proviso by
showing that our measure of prejudice predicts vote choice in elections contested by
Barack Obama. See infra text accompanying notes 298-300.
131. See 52 U.S.C. 10301(b) (Supp. II 2015) ("A violation ... is established if, based
on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that ... members of a [protected] class of
citizens ... have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice." (emphasis added)).
132. Thanks to Kevin Quinn for suggesting this analogy. The case for relying on cor-
relational evidence in the legal setting considered here is, on its face, stronger than the
case for relying on correlational evidence in the heart-disease example. In the legal set-
ting, the causal mechanism (linking racial attitudes to behavior) is knowable to some ex-
tent through introspection or everyday social interaction, whereas in the medical setting
intuition is probably not a good guide for laypersons.
133. See, e.g., Donald R. Kinder & Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics
and Democratic Ideals 15-18 (1996) (analyzing national surveys on equal opportunity,
racially based federal assistance, and affirmative action to assess public views of racial mat-
ters); Christopher Tarman & David O. Sears, The Conceptualization and Measurement of




provisos.3 4 Accordingly, the "constitutional risk" question may be re-
solved (presumptively) by examining whether white voting-age citizens in
the defendant jurisdiction subscribe to substantially negative stereotypes
of the minority group. The courts, perhaps aided by DOJ, will need to
define a quantitative benchmark for what constitutes legally significant
racial stereotyping.'35 Once this benchmark has been set, the question of
whether a particular jurisdiction falls above or below it can be answered
using national survey data and multilevel statistical modeling.
2. Racial Polarization in Partisanship. - Instead of (or in addition to)
focusing on discrimination in the electorate, courts might ground "con-
stitutional risk" presumptions on whether public officials have cause to
discriminate against the racial minority so as to perpetuate their hold on
power. Under certain conditions, those in power may benefit from sup-
pressing minority participation irrespective of whether the officials (or
majority-race voters) negatively stereotype the character or abilities of the
minority.
This political incentive to discriminate most clearly arises when there
is a strong correlation between voters' race and their reliability as parti-
san voters (or as consistent voters for any other established political fac-
tion). Blacks, for example, are reliable Democratic voters.
136 So when
Republicans hold the reins of power, they have political incentives to di-
minish black turnout. In recognition of this incentive, courts might deem
the constitutional-risk requirement presumptively satisfied in cases brought
by black voters against Republican-enacted voting requirements or redis-
tricting plans so long as the plaintiffs show disparate impact and establish
that the political incentive to discriminate holds in the defendant juris-
diction, not just in the nation generally.
3 7
To be sure, reasonable people may disagree about the propriety of
inferring race discrimination, even presumptively, from "political incen-
tives plus disparate impact." Given present political alignments, the political-
incentives presumption would tend to hobble Republican but not Democratic
134. See Elmendorf & Spencer, Preclearance, supra note 19, at 1142-55 (explaining
why survey data can capture racial attitudes correlated with political attitudes Constitution
disallows as basis for state action). The conventional measures tap perceptions of racial dif-
ferences in work ethic, intelligence, trustworthiness, and the like. These measures aren't
perfect-some respondents may not understand their own biases and others may not re-
port their biases truthfully. The conventional measures may also be weaker for non-black
minorities. But until better measures are produced, the conventional measures should
suffice.
135. See infra section III.B (discussing need for courts to coordinate common presump-
tions and develop "legally significant" racial stereotyping standard for section 2 litigation).
136. For some evidence of this and a model of associated political incentives, see Cox
& Holden, supra note 28, at 564-79.
137. Cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1993) (rejecting that section 2 cases
may be resolved on basis of what is typical nationally, rather than what is true in defendant
jurisdiction).
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efforts to adjust electoral ground rules for partisan advantage.138 This may
make the presumption too politically fraught for the courts to adopt.139
Another objection is that the political incentives presumption would
really capture incentives to discriminate on the basis of partisanship, not
race. Courts have long struggled to distinguish racial from political dis-
crimination in section 2 and equal protection cases.140 Political discrim-
ination is generally regarded as constitutionally innocuous, whereas race
discrimination is deemed invidious.14 1
Despite its roots in some important election law cases,14 2 the partisanship-
not-race objection is hard to square with broader constitutional princi-
ples. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits state actors from classifying
persons by race and subjecting them to disparate treatment, unless doing
so advances a compelling state interest that cannot be protected using
race-neutral means.4 3 Racial animus and ugly stereotypes are not pre-
138. In recent years, Republicans have promoted reforms that would make it harder
for low-income and young people (groups disproportionately comprised of racial minori-
ties) to vote, whereas Democrats have sought to expand turnout among the same de-
mographics. See Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election
Meltdown 163-67 (2012) (describing recent debates between Republicans and Democrats
over voter fraud and voter-ID election laws as battles of "access versus integrity").
139. An intentionalist judge might also speculate that the median member of the
coalition that enacted section 2's results test would not have supported the political-incentives
presumption. The results test emerged from a bipartisan compromise. See Boyd &
Markman, supra note 67, at 1414-20 (detailing role of Senator Bob Dole in facilitating
compromise on 1982 Amendments to VRA).
140. See Greiner, Causal Inference, supra note 63, at 593-95 (arguing courts make in-
correct assumptions about impact of race on political processes); Richard L. Hasen, Race
or Party? How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote
in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 58, 67-70 (2014),
http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvoll27_hasen.pdf [http://
perma.cc/K2T5-GX4B] (discussing cases in which Court could not separate unconstitu-
tional gerrymandering based on race from permissible redistricting based on party con-
siderations); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 Calif. L.
Rev. 1201, 1220-27 (1996) (arguing courts' difficulty disaggregating race and politics in
section 2 cases is caused by race and political affiliation being "substantially correlated");
Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting
Rights in the 1990s, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1517, 1565-67 (2002) [hereinafter Pildes, Voting-
Rights Law] ("The Supreme Court's key engagement with these amendments reflects
deep divisions on whether separating racial from partisan reasons for differences in pref-
erences between black and white voters is appropriate.").
141. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) ("We must determine
whether there is adequate support for the District Court's key findings, particularly the ul-
timate finding that the legislature's motive was predominantly racial, not political.").
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 507 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny
to California's practice of segregating inmates by race during sixty-day evaluation period,
notwithstanding undisputed evidence concerning violent prison gangs organized along
racial lines); cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.ll (1994) (stating gender-
based classifications utilizing stereotypes violate Equal Protection Clause "even when some
statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization").
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requisites for an equal protection violation.14 It is the fact of disparate
treatment on the basis of race that triggers strict scrutiny, not the reason
for the treatment.
If the correlation between race and partisan voting behavior is ex-
tremely high, politically motivated state actors will have strong incentives
to classify and target voters on the basis of their race. Race is generally
easy to observe. Consistent partisan voting behavior is much harder to
observe, for the ballot is secret and citizens do not wear their voting his-
tory on their sleeves. Because race is more readily observed than reliable
partisanship, elites seeking partisan political advantage have incentives to
target voters on the basis of their race.
That said, the Supreme Court has been wary about applying the anti-
stereotyping logic of equal protection doctrine in cases about political
discrimination. In racial gerrymandering cases, for example, the Court
has crafted decision rules that make it very difficult to challenge state ac-
tions that classify voters by race if the action can be explained as a parti-
san maneuver and the racial classification is not facially evident.14
5 But the
Court has never denied the proposition that disparate treatment on the
basis of race in the political sphere offends the Constitution's equal pro-
tection norm.1'
It bears emphasis, finally, that the political incentives approach
would not necessarily result in commonplace, Republican-preferred vot-
144. Judge Kozinksi explains the point nicely:
The lay reader might wonder if there can be intentional discrimination
without an invidious motive. Indeed there can. A simple example may help illus-
trate the point. Assume you are an anglo homeowner who lives in an all-white
neighborhood. Suppose, also, that you harbor no ill feelings toward minorities.
Suppose further, however, that some of your neighbors persuade you that having
an integrated neighborhood would lower property values and that you stand to
lose a lot of money on your home. On the basis of that belief, you join a pact not
to sell your house to minorities. Have you engaged in intentional racial and eth-
nic discrimination? Of course you have. Your personal feelings toward minorities
don't matter; what matters is that you intentionally took actions calculated to
keep them out of your neighborhood.
Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (1990) (Kozinski, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
145. See Easley, 532 U.S. at 258 (holding plaintiffs challenging electoral district on
ground race "predominated" over other considerations in its design must show defendant
could have achieved its political objectives equally well using more racially heterogeneous
districts); see also Elmendorf & Spencer, Preclearance, supra note 19, at 1134-35 (discuss-
ing Easley). It is perhaps a sign of changes to come, however, that the Court's most recent
decision concerning a "racial predominance" claim, Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v.
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015), does not mention Easley's requirement.
146. Indeed, in Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993), the Court seemed to accept
that racial vote dilution undertaken for partisan political reasons would be unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 159-60 (holding evidence did not support district court's finding that redis-
tricting authority "sought to minimize the Democratic Party's power by diluting minority
voting strength," but not questioning district court's premise that intentional race discrim-
ination undertaken for partisan purposes is constitutionally proscribed).
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ing requirements with a racially disparate impact being invalidated in
jurisdictions with large minority populations and allowed to stand else-
where. A defendant might rebut the inference of racial targeting by show-
ing that voting restrictions similar to the one at issue are strongly backed
by Republicans in states without a sizeable, heavily Democratic minority
population. (Ordinary voter-ID requirements might survive; rollbacks of
Sunday early voting in communities with politically mobilized black chur-
ches probably would not.) Or defendants might show that the voting re-
striction is well designed to advance important state interests,147 or that
the state made a good faith effort to monitor and curtail race discrimina-
tion by administrators who implement the law.
By shifting the burden of persuasion to defendants, the courts sim-
ply acknowledge that partisan motives do not merit the same presump-
tion of legitimacy in jurisdictions where the partisan payoff to racial dis-
crimination is exceptional.
To summarize, "constitutional risk" may be inferred, presumptively,
from evidence of widespread negative stereotyping of the minority or (at
least arguably) from evidence that the state actors responsible for the chal-
lenged electoral arrangements had strong partisan incentives to discrimi-
nate against the racial minority. The next question-and the subject of
the next section-is whether analogous presumptions can be crafted for
the disparate impact prong of section 2 cases.
C. Presumptions About Disparate Impact
As noted above, section 2 is concerned with two quite different sorts
of impacts: racial disparities in opportunities to cast a valid, duly counted
ballot (the issue in vote denial cases) and racial disparities in opportuni-
ties to secure representation (the issue in vote dilution cases). Because
dilution and denial can occur independently of one another,48 different
presumptions are needed for each class of cases.
147. One of the "totality of circumstances" factors that courts regularly consider in
section 2 cases is the degree to which the challenged law is tenuous or advances important
state interests. See, e.g., Hous. Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1991) (not-
ing state interest in electing trial judges from districts coextensive with trial court's jurisdic-
tion "is a factor to be considered by the court in evaluating whether the evidence in a par-
ticular case supports a finding [that this practice is] a vote dilution violation"); Katz et al.,
supra note 30, at 727-30 (reviewing case law in lower courts).
148. The issue in typical dilution cases is whether the rules for translating votes into
representation make it difficult for the minority community to secure representation-giv-
en the distribution of political preferences in the electorate-even if minorities can vote with-
out hindrance. See generally Heather K Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted
Vote, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1663, 1671-81 (2001) [hereinafter Gerken, Understanding] (explain-
ing concept of dilution as it developed in courts).
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1. Vote Dilution. - Though there is still ample room for disagree-
ment about the meaning of disparate impact in dilution cases,'4 9 most
courts assess disparate impact by comparing the number of MODs-dis-
tricts in which the minority community can elect its "candidates of
choice"-with some benchmark conception of the appropriate or fair
number of MODs."' Arguably the dominant approach is to treat "rough
proportionality" as the fairness benchmark (equivalence between the
minority's population share and its share of electoral districts), but only
insofar as proportionality can be achieved within a system of compact
single-member districts drawn in accordance with traditional criteria."'
To evaluate disparate impact, then, a court must establish whether
the racial minority has distinct political preferences that set it apart from
the majority group15 2 and if so, whether or to what extent the minority
can elect its candidates of choice. (Absent some racial divergence in polit-
ical preferences or interests, it does not make sense to speak of minority-
race voters as a group having "candidates of choice.""')
It follows that evidence of racial polarization may come into play un-
der the "disparate impact" as well as the "constitutional risk" prong of a
dilution case-although evidence that a court deems sufficient under one
prong may not satisfy the other. For example, a court might reasonably
149. See generally Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manu-
script at 37-42) (contrasting four theories of racial vote dilution).
150. Some courts also weigh opportunities for minority influence through channels
other than the election of "candidates of choice." See id. (manuscript at 38-40) (discuss-
ing "coalitional breakdown" theory of vote dilution, and associated cases).
151. See Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 59 ("[P]roportionality has be-
come an increasingly crucial issue in Section 2 cases."); see also Katz et al., supra note 30,
at 730-32 (noting in nearly all cases in which lower courts made finding on proportional-
ity, liability question was resolved accordingly); cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 436 (2006) (beginning "totality of circumstances" inquiry by assessing
proportionality, implying it is especially important factor to consider). Note, however, that
LULAC's ultimate finding of liability was not grounded on the lack of proportionality, and
in a subsequent opinion Judge Easterbrook expressly rejected the proportionality bench-
mark in favor of something like "the number of majority minority districts that probably
would have been drawn by an automated redistricting algorithm following traditional cri-
teria." Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, 535 F.3d 594, 599-600 (7th Cir. 2008). And it is certainly
clear that the state has no obligation to achieve "proportionality" except insofar as it can
be done by drawing reasonably compact, majority-minority districts. This follows from LULAC,
which counts only "reasonably compact" majority-minority districts in the proportionality
analysis, see 548 U.S. at 437-38, and which declares, "there is no § 2 right to a district that
is not reasonably compact," id. at 430 (citing Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 111-12
(1997)).
152. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-51 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(Brennan, J.) ("If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the
selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group inter-
ests."); Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 48-50 (discussing meaning of mi-
nority political cohesiveness).
153. See Gerken, Understanding, supra note 148, at 1677-79 (considering impor-
tance of group vote aggregation in influencing political process).
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require extreme polarization in partisanship under the constitutional risk
prong while holding that evidence of a statistically significant difference
in policy preferences establishes preference polarization under the im-
pact prong.'15
Notice too that under the impact prong, evidence of racial diver-
gence in political preferences or interests is clearly necessary but just as
clearly not sufficient. Whether the minority community has the oppor-
tunity to elect a roughly proportional number of its candidates of choice
depends not only on the extent of preference polarization but also the
geographic distribution of voters of each racial group and the rules for
aggregating votes into outcomes. Courts need tools for determining whe-
ther any particular legislative district is an MOD.
Presently, judges resolve the group-cohesion/polarization and
opportunity-district questions using estimates of white and minority vot-
ing patterns in recent elections in the defendant jurisdiction.15 These
estimates are created by ecological inference from aggregate data-vote
tallies and demographics at the precinct level.'15 Generating the esti-
mates is costly. Expert witnesses must retrieve several years' worth of pre-
cinct-level election results from county courthouses, digitize the data, merge
it with demographic data from the Census, and then apply several differ-
ent statistical tools for estimating the correlation between race and vote
choice.15 Litigants then do battle over which elections are most "proba-
tive" of group political cohesion and minority opportunity. 151 Courts mud-
dle through; the relevant legal doctrines give trial judges enormous dis-
cretion but not much guidance about how to exercise it.1 59
This process could be greatly streamlined if the courts recognized re-
buttable presumptions about racial-group cohesion and MODs, presump-
tions whose application would depend on national survey data rather
than local election results. The next two sections survey the possibilities,
beginning with the question of preference/interest divergence and then
moving on to the question of whether a district should be counted as an
MOD.
154. Subtle differences in different courts' normative theories of vote dilution may
also lead the courts to expect different kinds of showings of preference polarization. See
Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript at 42-49) (explain-
ing conflicting implications of several normative theories of dilution).
155. See generally id. (manuscript at 15-35) (reviewing and explaining judicial practice).
156. See generally Greiner, Ecological Inference, supra note 78 (evaluating ecological
inference methods used in assessing racial voting patterns).
157. Interview with VRA Litigator, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 6, 2014); Telephone Interview
with Voting Rights Expert Witness (Jan. 3, 2014).
158. See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript at 24-
27) (detailing selection and weighting of elections).
159. See id. (manuscript at 33) ("[T]here are no established quantitative cutoffs to dis-
tinguish polarized from non-polarized communities, no clear-edge rules about which elec-
tions to include in the polarization analysis and how to weight them, and ... racial assump-
tions are ... baked into the statistical tools .... ").
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a. Preference/Interest Divergence (Polarization). - Using national sur-
vey data, there are several ways to answer the question of whether plain-
tiffs belong to a racial community with distinct political interests or pref-
erences, not shared by the racial majority: (1) base polarization deter-
minations on voting-age citizens' stated political preferences (preference
polarization);" (2) base polarization determinations on citizens' inter-
ests (interest polarization); or (3) base polarization determinations on
the results of survey experiments (a variant on preference polarization).
This section briefly describes the three approaches; Part IV reports origi-
nal empirical results on preference polarization.
Existing national surveys contain a wealth of individual-level data
about respondents' policy positions, party identification, demographics,
etc. With the aid of recently popularized statistical techniques, these data
can be used to generate estimates of racially polarized preferences within
small geographic units, such as congressional districts, state legislative
districts, or counties.
Alternatively, census data can be used to establish differences be-
tween racial groups in terms of economic position, health status, incar-
ceration rates, and the like. This approach to the polarization inquiry
presumes that people vote their interests rather than their principles,
which is not always true.161 But the interest-based approach has the ad-
vantage of not relying on litigant-generated models to produce estimates
of local public opinion, as the relevant data are available from the Census
Bureau at the geographic scales needed for section 2 litigation.1
62 The
preference-based approach is, however, more in keeping with the exist-
ing judicial focus on voter preferences,6 3 as well as recent empirical evi-
160. Whether the presumptions should reflect the political preferences of all voting-
eligible citizens, or only registered voters or likely voters, is a question this Article does not
resolve.
161. Cf. Andrew Gelman et al., Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why
Americans Vote the Way They Do 48-54 (expanded paperback ed. 2010) (showing system-
atic regional differences in degree to which affluent people vote their economic interests);
Eitan Hersh & Clayton Nall, The Primacy of Race in the Geography of Income-Based
Voting: New Evidence from Public Voting Records, Am. J. Pol. Sci. (forthcoming 2015),
http://www.stanford.edu/-nall/docs/cata9.6.pdf [http://perma.cc/P9RB-L6SX] (explor-
ing geographic variation in correlation between income and partisan voting).
162. The objective approach might be implemented with the types of factor analysis
that Nick Stephanopoulos has used to measure the spatial heterogeneity of legislative dis-
tricts. See Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, supra note 40, at 94-101 (de-
scribing refinements to factor analysis method of evaluating districts' spatial diversity);
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1903, 1907 (2012) (syn-
thesizing socioeconomic data from Census to produce "single figure for each [congres-
sional] district that shows ... how spatially homogeneous or heterogeneous the district
is").
163. See, e.g., United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 910 (9th Cir. 2004) (re-
jecting any approach to polarization inquiry that would require judges to "second guess
voters' understanding of their own best interests"). But see League of United Latin Am.
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dence about geographic variation in income-based voting and ontologi-
cal commitments to free will."
Both preference- and interest-based approaches present challenges
when racial groups polarize on some but not all issues, ideological di-
mensions, or interests. The responsible decisionmaker must decide how
to weight the various indicators of cohesion or polarization. But this
problem-for purposes of a rebuttable presumption of cohesion or po-
larization-is less vexing and less of a barrier to preliminary relief than
the analogous problem, in a conventional racial polarization analysis, of
deciding which elections to include in the analysis and how to weight
them.165
One reason it is less vexing is that the rebuttable presumptions
would be implemented using national survey data. This means that the
same universe of issues and summary measures of preferences (or inter-
ests) will be available in all section 2 cases. Once a circuit court decides
that a particular measure suffices, either in general or for a particular
type of governmental body,66 subsequent section 2 cases can be brought
in other states and localities using the very same measures. By contrast,
courts answering the polarization question with data on vote shares usu-
ally give the most weight to recent elections for the governmental body at
issue in the case.67 Each case therefore depends on sets of election re-
sults unique to the case. The bottom line is that an evolving "common
law" of racial polarization with respect to preferences or interests should
provide more guidance regarding the likely outcome of the next case
than has the common law of racial polarization with respect to vote
shares in candidate elections.168 This has obvious implications for the
availability of preliminary relief.
Second, because the presumption of racial polarization would be re-
buttable, courts need not be perfectionist about the measure. A generic
measure of ideology scaled from issue preferences (i.e., first dimension
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 430-35 (2006) (incorporating evidence of socioeconomic
conditions into evaluation of district's "compactness").
164. Supra note 163.
165. Courts struggle all the time with whether to include or how to weight voting data
from white versus white elections, primary elections, and elections to governmental bodies
other than the one at issue. See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60
(manuscript at 24-27, 29-31) (observing courts have "opted for loose guidelines" on types
of elections to weigh in analysis, causing disagreement over probative value of "mono-
racial," primary, and "exogenous" elections).
166. One example would be measures of educational attainment used in school
board election cases.
167. See Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 54-55 (noting many courts
have discounted, and some even refuse to consider, evidence of racial polarization in "ex-
ogenous" elections, i.e., elections for governmental body other than one at issue in case).
168. This common law still might not provide enough guidance without a strong as-
sist from DOJ. See infra notes 222-231 (discussing DOJ's ability to induce judicial coor-
dination by issuing section 2 interpretive rules).
2015] 2179
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
ideal points) arguably should suffice for most elections,1 6 9 even though
citizens with the same ideal points may have important disagreements on
certain issues.'7 0 Alternatively, judges could ask litigants to show the rela-
tive importance that minority and white voters attach to different is-
sues.71 Cohesion and polarization determinations could then be based
on issue preferences weighted by their importance to minority voters. Of
course, any court that continued to regard polarized voting in local elec-
tions as particularly informative about group political cohesion could
invite litigants to rebut the presumption with local voting data.
Perhaps the cleanest solution to the "which issues" problem is to
base polarization determinations on preferences revealed through survey
experiments. One of us shows in a working paper that this can be done
by asking voters to choose between pairs of hypothetical candidates
whose race and endorsements have been randomized.
7
1
Whichever measure one favors, the important point for present pur-
poses is that it is feasible to create presumptions about within-group po-
litical similarity and between-group political difference without reference to
voting patterns in recent elections in the defendant jurisdiction. The viability of
a section 2 claim need not depend on expensive expert witness analyses
of local voting data, on statistically tenuous techniques of ecological in-
ference, or on the happenstance of whether plaintiff-race candidates
have recently run for office in the locale.
b. Minority Opportunity Districts. - The existence of significant po-
larization in interests or preferences between white and minority com-
munities does not necessarily mean that particular minority plaintiffs lack
169. On scaling ideology from issue positions, see generally Joshua D. Clinton, Using
Roll Call Estimates to Test Models of Politics, 15 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 79 (2012) (reviewing
methods of analyzing and interpreting roll call voting to determine ideology). For a treat-
ment of some issues that arise when the same methods are used to scale ordinary citizens'
ideology, see generally Jeffrey B. Lewis & Chris Tausanovitch, Has Joint Scaling Solved the
Achen Objection to Miller and Stokes? (Feb. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/miller-stokes/05_MillerStokesLewisTausanovitch.pdf [http://perm
a.cc/62Z6-W37K] (arguing methodologies for estimating legislator ideology from roll call
voting are incompatible with public opinion polls).
170. See David E. Broockman, An Artificial "Disconnect" 16-19 (Oct. 24, 2014) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (illustrating voters with aver-
age responses across several issues appear moderate but provide extreme responses to sin-
gle issues).
171. To fully implement this approach, the organizations that conduct large-scale na-
tional surveys would have to be convinced to ask priorities questions alongside the issue-
position questions. If DOJ asked for this information and provided some funding, we think
the survey organizations would be more than happy to obtain it.
172. See Abrajano et al., Using Experiments, supra note 122, at 13-18 (detailing study
methodology). For a related idea, see generally Will Bullock, Kosuke Imai & Jacob N.
Shapiro, Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant
Groups in Pakistan, 19 Pol. Analysis 363 (2011) (randomizing group endorsement of poli-
cy positions and using Bayesian hierarchical models to infer geographic variation in sup-
port for endorsers).
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a realistic opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. If the minority
community is large and if polarization is not too extreme, enough white
voters may "cross over" and support minority-preferred candidates for
the candidates to be electable. So polarization alone is not enough to es-
tablish a presumption of dilution (disparate impact). The court needs
some way of gauging whether particular districts are minority oppor-
tunity districts and then comparing the share of MODs to the minority's
population share.'7 3
Historically the courts have assessed the likely "performance" of
electoral districts with detailed inquiries into local political conditions.7 4
Into the mix go the results of past elections, the extent of racial polariza-
tion, racial differences in voter eligibility and voter turnout rates, anecdo-
tal testimony from local politicians, consultants, and interest groups, and
more.'7 5
One straightforward way to simplify this inquiry is to presume that a
district is an MOD if and only if the minority community composes at
least 50% of the district's citizen voting age population (CVAP). 7 Be-
cause the Constitution prevents the government from erecting substan-
tial barriers to registration and voting,177 it may be said that any district in
which the minority community makes up at least half of the voting-eligible
173. This assumes that what is being challenged is a system of single-member districts.
If the plaintiffs were challenging at-large elections or multi-member districts, then what
would be needed is a method for assessing minority opportunity under that system.
174. See Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 56-59 (explaining since
Gingles courts have had to assess whether white bloc voting "usually [results in] defeat of
the minority's preferred candidate" and this inquiry requires courts to consider "a variety
of factual circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stephanopoulos, The
South After Shelby County, supra note 40, at 80 (discussing predictive judgments about
ability-to-elect under section 5).
175. All of these factors figure into the "totality of circumstances" analysis of a section
2 case. See generally Katz et al., supra note 30, at 675-730 (discussing "Senate Factors").
176. CVAP estimates from the Census are less precise than estimates of the total vot-
ing age population. See Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to
Count, Whom to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 755, 773-82
(2011) (arguing difficulties obtaining reliable citizenship data should lead Court to clarify
total voting age population is appropriate metric for demonstrating size of minority com-
munity). This imprecision does not concern us because the estimates would only be used
to establish a rebuttable presumption and because estimation errors should to substantial
degree wash out as CVAP estimates at the level of census blocks and tracts are aggregated
to the level of legislative districts.
177. At the least, the Constitution prevents the government from erecting barriers
that are substantial for some people but not for others. See Crawford v. Marion Cty.
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198-200 (2008) (finding burdens imposed by Indiana voter-ID
law not sufficiently substantial to invalidate statute partly because of mitigations to protect
those burdened by law); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)
("[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of
requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.").
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population is by definition an opportunity district.
178 Some of these dis-
tricts may not "perform" for minority candidates owing to race-correlated
differences in rates of voter registration, turnout, or information about
the candidates, but since section 2 protects equality of opportunity rather
than equality of results,179 these differences arguably should be disregard-
ed (unless they can be fairly attributed to race discrimination in violation
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
180).
In recent years, voting rights claimants have often argued that strict-
ly majority-minority districts are not necessary to provide the "opportu-
nity to elect" minority candidates of choice, and indeed that such dis-
tricts may weaken the minority community's overall political influence by
wasting minority votes.181 Certainly there are more nuanced alternatives
to the "50% CVAP" rule, such as presuming that a district is an MOD if
the minority community composes a majority of the citizens in the dis-
trict who prefer the major political party with the most support among
the district's voters;182 or classifying districts based on the joint distribu-
tion of political and racial preferences in the district electorate. Space
limitations preclude an adequate treatment of these alternatives here,
but we plan to take them up in future work.18
3
178. See Jeffers v. Beebe, 895 F. Supp. 2d 920, 930-33 (E.D. Ark. 2012) (holding after
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J.), any district
which is majority-minority by voting-eligible citizens is minority opportunity district as mat-
ter of law).
179. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.11 (1994).
180. See Salas v. Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992) (not-
ing protected class would be entitled to section 2 relief if turnout disparities were attribut-
able to prior official discrimination); Theane Evangelis, Note, The Constitutionality of
Compensating for Low Minority Voter Turnout in Districting, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 796, 808
(2002) ("The Supreme Court's current equal protection doctrine requires strict scrutiny
review for race-conscious tate policies, including excessively race-conscious districting.").
181. This issue is front and center in pending constitutional challenges to statewide
redistricting maps in Alabama and North Carolina. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v.
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262, 1274 (2015) (vacating district court decision rejecting
plaintiffs' claim Alabama violated Fourteenth Amendment by drawing majority-minority
districts not reasonably necessary to comply with VRA); see also Dickson v. Rucho, 135 S.
Ct. 1843 (2015) (vacating similar decision of North Carolina Supreme Court for reconsid-
eration in light of Alabama Legislative Black Caucus).
182. Cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 485-86 (2006)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting this standard as gloss on
Gingles numerosity requirement).
183. It might also be argued that the minority-opportunity-district presumption
should account for race-correlated differences in voter turnout. Reasoning thus, some
courts have applied a "65%" rather than a "50%" rule of thumb, see, e.g., Barnett v. City of
Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1998) ("A black-majority ward, then, is one that is
at least 65 percent black on a total-population basis .... "); Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d
1398, 1416 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Numerous courts have either specifically adopted or tacitly
approved the use of this 65% figure."), although this convention appears to have faded.
See Pildes, Voting-Rights Law, supra note 140, at 1527-28 ("[B]y 1990, the 65% rule was
considered exceptional."). Evangelis, supra note 180, at 801, argues that adjusting for
turnout in this way is unconstitutional.
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2. Vote Denial. - Crafting disparate-impact presumptions for vote
denial cases is difficult. The range of election rules and practices that
might be challenged on a denial theory is vast and so too the range of
possible remedies.
The vote denial cases are quite new, and there is not yet much law
on what constitutes a material, legally significant impact.18 4 The Seventh
Circuit per Judge Easterbrook recently suggested that section 2 is violated
only if the challenged barrier to voting is pointless,'85 facially discrimina-
tory,186 or hard for diligent voters to comply with.'87 The district court in
the same case characterized the burden very differently, focusing on ra-
cial disparities in the incidence of compliance costs and the likelihood of
a correlative disparity in rates of voter participation.18  In the Sixth
Circuit, a slight rollback in the days available for early voting was deemed
sufficiently impactful to violate section 2.189 Yet an earlier Sixth Circuit
decision ruled out section 2 challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws
on the theory that the felon had no one but himself to blame for getting
disenfranchised.190 An analogous voter-fault argument easily could have
been used to dismiss the early-voting claim.
Because the law is inchoate and the cases diverse, rebuttable pre-
sumptions for the disparate-impact prong of a vote denial case must be
ventured tentatively. In that cautious spirit, we offer two ideas. First, ma-
terial burdens on the franchise that are disproportionately borne by low-
income citizens may be presumed to have a racially disparate impact in
184. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th Cir.
2014) ("[T] here is a paucity of appellate case law evaluating the merits of Section 2 claims
in the vote-denial context.").
185. See Frank v. Walker, 768 F3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) ("[U]nless Wisconsin
makes it needlessly hard to get photo ID, it has not denied anything to any voter.").
186. See id. (" [The Wisconsin voter-ID statute] extends to every citizen an equal op-
portunity to get a photo ID."); id. at 754 ("It is better to understand [the results test] as an
equal-treatment requirement ... than as an equal-outcome command. . . ").
187. See id. at 752-53 (reviewing evidence of racial disparities in possession of qualify-
ing photo ID and in documents required to obtain qualifying photo ID and concluding,
"[a]lthough these findings document a disparate outcome, they do not show a 'denial' of
anything by Wisconsin").
188. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 870-78 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (discussing ra-
cial disparities in rates of possession of qualifying ID as well as documentation needed to
obtain ID, linking these to socioeconomic disparities, and emphasizing "under the domi-
nant framework used by scholars to study voter turnout, even small increases in the costs
of voting can deter a person from voting"), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744.
189. See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 549-60 (6th Cir.
2014) (finding disparate impact and applying "Senate factors" to conclude early-voting re-
strictions burdened black voters and are linked to "social and historical conditions").
190. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Nor are felons disen-
franchised because of an immutable characteristic, such as race, but rather because of
their conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which they assume the risks of deten-
tion and punishment."); see also Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F3d 306, 315-17 (3d Cir.
1994) (rejecting challenge to law purging voters who have registered but failed to vote in
past from voter rolls on ground that voter is at fault).
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those jurisdictions where Census data show that minority-race citizens are
substantially worse off economically than members of the majority group.
Much remains to be worked out here. What measure of economic well-
being should be used? What constitutes a "substantial" between-group
disparity in economic well-being?
All that said, the idea that disparate impacts by class can serve as a
proxy for perhaps harder-to-observe disparate racial impacts is already
gaining traction in the lower courts. It is reflected in recentjudicial opin-
ions addressing photo-ID requirements for voting in Wisconsin and
Texas,191 and rollbacks in early voting and same-day voter registration in
Ohio and North Carolina.192 The idea also draws support from the legis-
lative history of section 2, which shows that Congress was quite con-
cerned about socioeconomic disparities between racial groups manifest-
ing as political inequalities.193
The other presumption goes to the question of materiality: Any vot-
ing requirement that has the demonstrable effect (compared to some
feasible regulatory alternative) of skewing the racial/ethnic makeup of
the population of actual voters, relative to the population of voting-eligible
citizens, should be presumptively regarded as materially burdensome. Al-
most certainly, this showing would have to be made using data from a range
of jurisdictions, because a simple before-and-after comparison of voter
participation in the defendant jurisdiction could be very misleading. Mi-
nority turnout in a single jurisdiction may fluctuate for any number of
reasons unrelated to the legal change.19 4 Courts should accept such evi-
dence from other jurisdictions, so long as the demographics of the rele-
vant minority populations are not grossly dissimilar.
191. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 660-64 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (tying conclu-
sions about racially disparate impact to finding that voter-ID law is more burdensome for
poor and poor are disproportionately minority), aff'd in part, vacated in part, No. 14-
41127, 2015 WL 4645642 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2015); Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 870-79 (same);
see also Texas v. Holder, 888 F Supp. 2d 113, 140-43 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying preclearance
to Texas voter-ID requirement, based on retrogressive effect inferred from correlation
between race and poverty), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013).
192. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 246 (4th Cir.
2014) (using disparate impact viewed in context of social and historical conditions to find
election reform law "textbook example of Section 2 vote denial"); Husted, 768 F.3d at 555-
57 (linking disparate reductions in voting opportunities to social and historical conditions
that "produce discrimination against African Americans").
193. S. Rep. No. 97417, at 29 n.114 (1982) ("[D]isproportionate educational[,] em-
ployment, income level and living conditions arising from past discrimination tend to
depress minority political participation. Where these conditions are shown, and where the
level of black participation ... is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further causal
nexus between their disparate socioeconomic status and the depressed ... participation."
(citations omitted)).
194. Cf. Robert S. Erikson & Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the Voter
Identification-Voter Turnout Debate, 8 Election L.J. 85, 96-98 (2009) (demonstrating
difficulty of detecting small turnout effects).
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Unlike the presumptions discussed above for constitutional risk, ra-
cial polarization, and minority opportunity districts, the presumptions
for vote-denial "impact" could not be implemented with national public
opinion data. At best they are rough guidelines that may help courts as
they struggle to produce a reasonably consistent body of law, notwith-
standing judges' contrasting intuitions about the burdens that any "rea-
sonable voter" ought to bear without complaint and the difficulty of de-
tecting racially disparate impacts amidst all the fluctuations in voter regis-
tration and turnout.9 5
3. Summary. - This Part has presented one account of how the core
of section 2 could be implemented using evidentiary presumptions and
current survey data, in keeping with the Shelby County Court's sense that
race-based remedial measures ought to be justified by the current risk of
unconstitutional race discrimination. Ours will not be the final word.
Some readers may disagree with our gloss on the core of section 2. Oth-
ers may see different and perhaps better ways to craft the presumptions.
What we hope to have shown is that it is at least feasible to answer-pre-
sumptively-some of the recurring questions in section 2 cases using na-
tional survey data, rather than the precinct-level vote tallies that have
been the bread and butter of section 2 litigation so far.
We also hope to have persuaded the reader that these presumptions,
if implemented with off-the-shelf statistical models, could enable section
2 to function more like section 5 in regions of the country where the pre-
sumptions operate to shift evidentiary burdens to the defendants. Redis-
tricters in such locales who do not provide minority communities with
"roughly proportional" opportunities for representation would very
likely face a section 2 lawsuit in which defendants would carry the burden
of disproving central elements of the case. Vote-denial claims would also
become easier for civil rights groups to litigate.
What remains to be established is that the courts have authority to
establish the presumptions and, further, that it is feasible to implement
(most of) the presumptions using national survey data rather than case-
specific studies carried out in particular defendant jurisdictions." We
turn to these questions in the next Parts.
III. AUTHORITY, LEGAL AND OTHERWISE
It is one thing to say that section 2 could be made to function like
section 5 if Congress authorized an administrative agency to promulgate
195. Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 643, 657
(2008) (arguing by focusing on turnout impacts in vote-denial cases arising under
Constitution, judges can bridge normative differences regarding "reasonable voter"
capacities).
196. If the presumptions required original, case-specific research, they would be
much more expensive to apply.
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substantive rules about evidentiary presumptions.197 It is quite another to
maintain that section 2 can function similarly without any intervening
action by Congress. This Part addresses two objections to our position:
first, that the courts lack legal authority to establish the kinds of eviden-
tiary presumptions suggested in Part II; second, that irrespective of legal
authority, the courts cannot reasonably be expected to establish such pre-
sumptions.
A. Legal Authority to Create the Presumptions
The proposition that courts lack legal authority to establish eviden-
tiary presumptions under section 2 has little force. As one of us ex-
plained in previous work, section 2 is best understood as a common law
statute.198 It delegates authority to the courts to implement loosely stated
substantive and evidentiary norms.199 The legislative history makes clear
that section 2's results test was supposed to alleviate some of the eviden-
tiary burdens associated with conventional intent tests in constitutional
law,200 but the courts were given broad discretion to shape the law going
forward.
The courts have not shied from exercising this discretion. The statu-
tory text instructs courts to base section 2 liability determinations on the
"totality of circumstances," but in the Supreme Court's first vote dilution
case under the results test, a four-Justice plurality tried to boil the matter
down to whether a politically cohesive minority community had been
consistently defeated at the polls.201 Some years later the Court resusci-
tated the "totality of circumstances" inquiry and in doing so made cen-
tral a factor that is not even mentioned in the legislative history: propor-
tionality between the number of MODs and the minority's population
share.202
197. Indeed, one possible legislative response to Shelby County would be to leave
section 5 and the now-invalidated coverage formula as is, while authorizing DOJ to put
new teeth into section 2 with substantive rules about evidentiary presumptions.
198. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 23, at 448-55.
199. See id. at 417-48 (discussing "helpful guidance" provided to courts by section 2
and legislative history in implementing equal voting norms).
200. See id. at 421-27 (noting legislative history reveals plaintiffs "may not be re-
quired" to meet "conventional evidentiary standards").
201. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Brennan,
J.) (" [M]ultimember districts may impair the ability of blacks to elect representatives of
their choice where blacks vote sufficiently as a bloc as to be able to elect their preferred
candidates in a black majority, single-member district and ... a white majority votes ... as
a bloc ... to defeat the candidates .... ").
202. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013-24 (1994) (finding totality of cir-
cumstances did not support vote dilution claim because number of minority districts was
"substantially proportional" to minority population share); Katz et al., supra note 30, at
730-31 (reporting of eighteen published cases in which courts made findings on pro-
portionality, "[t]he 10 lawsuits that found proportionality identified no violation of
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The lower courts have already developed rebuttable presumptions
and burden-shifting rules in response to the Supreme Court's signals.
Thus, after Gingles, a number of courts held that a showing of minority
political cohesion pus white bloc voting gives rise to a "strong presump-
tion" of section 2 liability. 203 Other courts, struggling with the question of
whether white bloc voting is "legally significant" only if "caused" by the
race of the candidate (or voters), held that a showing of racially polar-
ized voting in biracial elections gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of
race-discriminatory causation.2 04 Courts have also used rules of thumb
about the minority population share needed to ensure that an electoral
district functions as an MOD.205 In short, presumptions and burden-
shifting rules are already embedded in the warp and woof of section 2.
Crafting burden-shifting rules and presumptions to implement
broadly worded statutes is a familiar exercise for the courts. Judges put
teeth into Title VII and other civil rights statutes with judge-made burden-
shifting rules . 206 Courts also borrowed evidentiary rules of thumb put
forth in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guide-
lines, such as presuming a legally significant disparate impact where mi-
norities are hired by an employer at less than four-fifths of the rate of
white hiring.2 07 In antitrust law, the courts went further, deeming certain
business arrangements per se anticompetitive.208 Later courts relaxed
some of the per se rules in light of new economic theory and evidence.20
Section 2," and of the five lawsuits that "found a lack of proportionality[,] ... four identi-
fied a Section 2 violation").
203. The presumption also requires that the minority community be large enough to
satisfy the first Gingles factor. For cases recognizing this presumption, see supra note 111.
204. See supra note 111 (listing cases considering causation in totality of circum-
stances inquiry).
205. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text (discussing "65%" rule of
thumb for identifying minority opportunity districts).
206. Plaintiffs' showing of a racially disparate impact shifts the burden to the defend-
ant to come forth with a legitimate rationale for the challenged law or practice, after
which the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of showing that the measures at issue are not
reasonably necessary to serve the defendant's legitimate interests. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
207. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586-87 (2009) (finding prima facie
case of disparate-impact liability shown, as EEOC's 80% rule was violated); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988) (noting lower courts' use of EEOC's four-
fifths rule); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 n.4 (1982) (acknowledging district
court's finding of disparate impact under EEOC's 80% rule).
208. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 733, 744-45 (2012) (discussing shift
from rule of reason analysis towards per se liability). The voting rights analogue would be
a ban on literacy tests, which Congress applied to the covered jurisdictions in 1965 and
extended nationally in 1970. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285,
84 Stat. 315.
209. See Gavil, supra note 208, at 751-59 (noting courts' recognition of inadequacy
of per se liability); see also Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic & Jonathan B. Baker,
Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 202-11
21872015]
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The rebuttable presumptions sketched in Part II are consistent with
the notion that lawmaking by common law courts should be evolutionary,
not revolutionary. Each presumption serves to implement a norm that is
already central to section 2 liability determinations. And because the pre-
sumptions would be rebuttable, they are compatible with the statutory
directive to base liability determinations on the totality of circumstances.210
To the extent that our presumptions would work a large change in
the law of section 2, the change is in the datasets and statistical tech-
niques on which courts and litigants rely.211 National survey data on citi-
zens' political preferences and racial attitudes, analyzed using MRP,
would partially supplant the current reliance on precinct-level election
returns and ecological inference.212 But there is nothing in the text or
legislative history of section 2 or in the Supreme Court's authoritative
constructions of the statute that compels judicial reliance on particular
statistical tools.213
Finally, on a purposive view of statutory interpretation, Shelby
County's negation of the section 5 preclearance regime counts strongly in
favor of interpreting section 2 so that it works more like section 5, pro-
vided of course that the reading does not push section 2 into the same
constitutionally problematic territory.214 The VRA as enacted in 1965-
and as reenacted in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006215-was predicated on a
handful of core premises, which our model for section 2 adapts to the
(2d ed. 2008) (describing evolution and application of presumptions shifting burden of
production-and in some cases, burden of proof-to defendant, even as Court moved
away from per se rules).
210. This Article imposes no limit on the "circumstances" that might be invoked to
rebut inferences from the presumptions.
211. To be sure, the effect of this change in the law could be substantial in that section
2 claims would probably become fairly easy to win in some parts of the country, and quite
difficult to win in other areas. But even this would only accentuate existing patterns. As
Peyton McCrary has shown, the vast majority of successfully litigated or settled section 2
cases were brought in the formerly covered jurisdictions. Declaration of Dr. Peyton
McCrary at 12, Shelby County v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-
00651-JDB), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Shelby-Decl-11-
15-10.pdf [http://perma.cc/DN92-BCYN]. The empirical results presented in Part IV,
infra, suggest that the same jurisdictions are likely to be the most vulnerable under the
presumption-driven model for section 2 (at least with respect to claims of African
Americans).
212. Using the proposed statistical model would only "partially" displace reliance on
precinct-level results because in some cases, defendants may try to rebut the inference of
racial polarization using data from local elections.
213. Notably, the seminal decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.), which reoriented vote dilution law around the estima-
tion of candidates' vote shares by racial group, states that evidence that members of a ra-
cial group tend to vote for the same candidates is simply "one way of proving the political
cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim." Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
214. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 405, 426-28 (1989) (defining purposive statutory interpretation).
215. Katz et al., supra note 30, at 646-17.
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post-Shelby County world. The essential premises are, first, that the risk of
unconstitutional race discrimination in the electoral process is higher in
some parts of the country than in others and, second, that where this risk
is high, mechanisms are needed to review, and in appropriate cases en-
join, potentially discriminatory laws before they take effect, with the bur-
den of proof borne by the alleged discriminator.216
The presumptions suggested here mesh these premises with section
2 while honoring Shelby County's understanding of when it is permissible
for legislation enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
single out states for special burdens. Shelby County faulted the preclear-
ance coverage formula for distinguishing among states on the basis of old
data that bore no apparent relationship to the current risk of unconstitu-
tional race discrimination.217 The presumptions would be implemented
using current data and would maintain a close connection between the
risk of section 2 liability (higher where evidentiary burdens are shifted to
the defendant) and the risk of unconstitutional state action.
B. Judicial Competence
That judges have legal authority to implement our approach does
not mean they will be able to do it or do it effectively on their own. Sec-
tion 2 cases present very difficult technical and legal questions. Our sense
from reading published section 2 opinions is that the first priority for
many judges is simply to avoid embarrassment.
Rather than wrestle with the reliability of different techniques of
ecological inference, judges continue to accept questionable methods on
the basis of an offhand, decades-old footnote from the Supreme Court
characterizing the methods as "standard in the literature."218 Harvard
statistician and law professor Jim Greiner wrote several outstanding pa-
pers critiquing standard ecological inference techniques and offering
better alternatives;219 his work has left no impression on the courts.220
216. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text (describing key elements and
goals of section 5).
217. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625-30 (2013) ("[T]he coverage for-
mula that Congress reauthorized in 2006 ignores these developments, keeping the focus
on decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting
current needs.").
218. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.20 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.). Some judges do
seem willing to accept the new, better methods only if their results accord with the older
methods. D. James Greiner, The Quantitative Empirics of Redistricting Litigation:
Knowledge, Threats to Knowledge, and the Need for Less Districting, 29 Yale L. & Pol'y
Rev. 527, 532-33 (2011) [hereinafter Greiner, Quantitative Empirics].
219. Greiner, Ecological Inference, supra note 78; Greiner & Quinn, Exit Polling and
Racial Bloc Voting, supra note 79; Greiner, Quantitative Empirics, supra note 218; Greiner,
Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting, supra note 69; D. James Greiner & Kevin M. Quinn, RxC
Ecological Inference: Bounds, Correlations, Flexibility and Transparency of Assumptions,




The continued acceptance of statistical techniques that are "standard"
per their use in prior cases (even if unreliable) saves the judge from po-
tential embarrassment, for if she errs, she makes only the same mistake as
her peers.
As for the law, section 2 offers an easy out to judges who don't want
to venture a transparent interpretation of the statute's substantive and
evidentiary norms: Glide past the conceptual questions, duly note that
the statutory text calls for liability determinations to be based on the "to-
tality of circumstances," and then recite a long list of circumstances that
nominally ground your decision.
The project of crafting rebuttable presumptions to implement
section 2 requires judges to take some risks-especially if plaintiffs are
invited to make evidentiary showings based on new-fangled statistical
techniques. And to fully realize the promise of our presumption-driven
approach to section 2, manyjudges must take the plunge, define the pre-
sumptions similarly, and agree on the datasets and models that litigants
may use to determine which presumptions apply in a given case.
Likelihood-of-success determinations will become straightforward
only if the courts coordinate on a common model and dataset, as well as
common definitions of the presumptions. The incremental, disaggre-
gated process of common law adjudication makes this coordination diffi-
cult, particularly given the wide range of plausible evidentiary presump-
tions.22' The obvious alternative is to assign responsibility for developing
the presumptions to an administrative agency. Agencies may compel ju-
dicial coordination by issuing rules with the force of law, agencies have
the necessary technical expertise, and agencies can involve a much
broader swath of the public in developing the law via advisory commit-
tees and notice-and-comment rulemaking. But section 2 does not dele-
gate rulemaking authority to any agency. DOJ litigates section 2 cases
from time to time but has never issued enforcement guidelines or inter-
pretive rules under section 2.222
It is conceivable that DOJ could nonetheless induce judicial coordi-
nation by issuing interpretive rules under section 2. These rules would be
advisory only, not binding, but they would be owed Skidmore deference.2 2 3
220. A Westlaw search turned up only one opinion that cites Greiner's work on eco-
logical inference. Levy v. Lexington County, No. 3:03-3093-MBS, 2012 WL 1229511, at *6
(D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2012) (discussing Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting, supra note
69). In Levy, a wise judge appointed Greiner's collaborator Kevin Quinn to advise the
court on statistical methods. Id. at *4 n.4.
221. See supra Part II (discussing wide range of possible presumptions to make
section 2 viable stand in for section 5).
222. Interview with Michael Pitts, Professor, Ind. Univ. Robert H. McKinney Sch. of
Law, and former trial attorney, Voting Section, U.S. Dep't ofJustice.
223. Under Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), judicial deference to agency posi-
tions varies according to the quality of the agency's decisionmaking process, taking ac-
count of any "factors which give [an interpretation] power to persuade, if lacking power to
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Title VII provides an instructive analogy: Interpretive guidelines issued by
the EEOC have not been treated as binding on the courts, but they are
given some weight and have played an important role in fleshing out
Title VII's disparate-impact standard.224 To be sure, some considerations
cut against judicial deference, such as the fact that DOJ has often been
accused of partisanship in the administration of voting rights laws.2 2 5 But
control." Id. at 139-40. We agree with Professor Nou that, in the election administration
context, the Skidmore framework counsels for calibrating deference to "the institutional
role of the actors authoring the interpretive documents and, specifically, the degree to
which they are internally politically insulated." Jennifer Nou, Sub-Regulating Elections,
2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 135, 152.
224. For example, the "four-fifths rule" in disparate impact cases originated with
EEOC guidelines. See cases cited supra note 207. To be sure, the track record of judicial
deference to EEOC positions is checkered. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise:
The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1937, 1949-61 (2006) (attributing
skepticism of some judges to perception EEOC is or has been pursuing narrowly political
agenda and not basing its rules on any material or technical expertise). As discussed next,
these same concerns could well arise with DOJ-issued guidelines under section 2, but the
concerns can be blunted if the agency takes them into account ex ante.
225. In the 2000s, under President George W. Bush, many career staffers in the voting
section departed and were replaced with new hires whom critics on the left derided as
partisan hacks. Charlie Savage, Report Examines Civil Rights During Bush Years, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/us/politics/03rights.html?_r
=1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Under President Obama, DOJ has taken a strong
stance against voter-ID laws and other measures favored by Republicans, leading Republicans
to levy the charge of unlawful partisanship. See Roger Clegg & Hans A. von Spakovsky,
More Voting-Rights Challenges from Holder, Nat'l Rev. Online (July 29, 2013), http://
www.nationalreview.com/article/354618/more-voting-rights-challenges-holder-roger-clegg-
hans-von-spakovsky [http://perma.cc/7SFG-254H] ("[The Obama] administration has a
highly politicized Civil Rights Division, and using the Voting Rights Act to achieve partisan
ends is nothing new for it."); Hans A. von Spakovsky, Every Single One: The Politicized
Hiring of Eric Holder's Voting Section, PJ Media (Aug. 8, 2011), http://pjmedia.com/blo
g/every-single-one-the-politicized-hiring-of-eric-holder's-voting-section/ [http://perma.cc/
4RD5-G28C] ("[T]he Civil Rights Division at the Department ofJustice is engaging in po-
liticized hiring in the career civil service ranks ... nearly unprecedented in scope and
significantly eclips[ing] anything the Bush administration was even accused of doing.").
Inspector General reports in 2008 and 2012 gave credence to some of the accusations
of partisanship. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office of the Inspector Gen., A Review of the Operations
of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division 117-80 (2013) (addressing allegations of
Voting Section employees mistreated on basis of political ideology); U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Office of the Inspector Gen. & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Prof'l Responsibility, An
Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring and Other Improper Personnel Actions in
the Civil Rights Division (2008) (summarizing investigation "into allegations that political
or ideological affiliations were considered in hiring, transferring, and assigning cases to
career attorneys in the Civil Rights Division"); U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office of the Inspector
Gen. & U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office of Prof'l Responsibility, An Investigation of Allegations
of Politicized Hiring in the Department of Justice Honors Program and Summer Law
Intern Program (2008) (describing results of investigation into "whether the political or
ideological affiliations of applicants were improperly considered in the selection of candi-
dates for the [Attorney General]'s Honors Program and the Summer Law Intern Program ...
from 2002 to 2006"); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Prof'l Responsibility & U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring
by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General (2008)
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if DOJ structured the process for developing the rules so as to preempt
the charge of partisanship,226 appellate courts might well defer because
DOJ rulemaking would save the courts from having to make difficult
technical determinations and because adoption of the rules would make
section 2 litigation less subject to the whims of individual trial judges.227
If judges generally followed DOJ's recommendations, this would
greatly reduce uncertainty about how the presumptions cut in a given
case. Rather than reinventing the wheel, plaintiffs' experts could simply
download the gold-standard model and dataset from DOJ's website, and
run it for the racial group (s) and jurisdiction at issue in the case. Once
the model has been accepted by a few courts, it will no longer be worth-
while for defendants to attack it in ordinary cases.228 At this point, a legal
regime that formally requires plaintiffs to make evidentiary showings with
respect to constitutional risk and disparate impact would function as if it
were a regime in which certain geographically delimited jurisdictions
were formally presumed to be at risk of unconstitutional race discrimina-
tion in the electoral process and in which certain electoral structures (in
these jurisdictions) are presumed to have a disparate impact.229 The gap
between section 2 and now-defunct section 5 would be much diminished.
(investigating "allegation that Goodling," DOJ's White House Liaison, "inappropriately
used political or ideological affiliations in the hiring process for career [DOJ] employees").
226. For example, by assigning rule development to a technical or bipartisan body
not controlled by political appointees at DOJ.
227. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Rulemaking and the Future of the
Voting Rights Act, 14 Election L.J. 260, 270-75 (2015) (assessing costs and benefits of ju-
dicial deference to DOJ guidelines under section 2 from perspective of appellate judges).
Professor Ross argues that the Supreme Court has shown no inclination to defer to agen-
cies on questions that implicate constitutional interpretation. Bertrall Ross, Denying
Deference: Civil Rights and Judicial Resistance to Administrative Constitutionalism, 2014
U. Chi. Legal Forum 223, 228. Ross's argument implies-and we agree-that the Court
would not defer to DOJ's decisions about, for example, whether section 2 still provides a
remedy for constitutional violations that occurred during the Jim Crow era. But so long as
DOJ works from the Court's own constitutional premises, Ross's argument provides no
basis for doubting judicial deference to agency positions on technical questions about
evidentiary presumptions. As explained supra notes 94-97, our presumptions build on an
interpretation of section 2 meant to reconcile the results test with the current Supreme
Court's constitutional understandings.
228. To be sure, in rare cases where the political stakes are very high, it may be worth-
while for defendants to attack the model, just as it was worthwhile in the pre-Shelby County
era for some covered jurisdictions to seek preclearance from the District Court of the
District of Columbia rather than DOJ in certain high-stakes, politically charged cases. See,
e.g., Rick Hasen, Alabama Bypassing DOJ in Favor of Court Seeking Preclearance of
Redistricting Plan, Election Law Blog (Sept. 14, 2011, 7:54 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/
?p=23078 [http://perma.cc/R4TK-GPSA] ("The pattern continues of Republicans in cov-
ered jurisdictions not trusting the Obama Administration's DOJ on Voting Rights Act pre-
clearance of controversial redistricting plans.").
229. We recognize that the gold-standard model would likely evolve over time, in
keeping with advances in political science and statistics. Turnover in DOJ's leadership may
also lead to a revisiting of the guidelines. Continued judicial acceptance of the guidelines
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But what if DOJ is rebuffed by the courts or stays on the sidelines?
That would retard the process of developing a presumption-driven
section 2 implemented with national survey data, but gradual change
would remain possible. For example, rather than asking courts to adopt
new presumptions under Gingles, litigants could introduce survey evi-
dence of racial polarization and racial stereotyping to supplement vote-
share evidence under Gingles, or as part of the "totality of circumstances."
Once one court gives some weight to this evidence, other litigants will
have incentives to bring it forward in the next case, and judges will have
to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of conventional and survey-
based evidence. Over time, even the most cautious, incrementalist judges
are likely to give progressively more weight to survey data because survey-
based estimates do not suffer from the problems that make it difficult to
infer preference polarization and voter discrimination from vote shares
for "minority candidates of choice,"2 3 0 and because survey-based estima-
tion does not involve ecological inference.23 '
As evidence from national surveys starts to play a larger role in the
adjudication of section 2 cases, the decisions themselves will provide in-
creasing guidance about how pending or prospective cases are likely to
be resolved. For example, if the level of racial polarization in jurisdiction
A is deemed "legally significant," and if the same or higher levels of po-
larization exist in jurisdiction B per the data sources and statistical models
used in the previous case, then lawyers for both parties in a newly filed case
against jurisdiction B should have a pretty good sense of whether a court
is likely to find legally significant polarization in B.
One might suppose that this would be true irrespective of whether
the second case is litigated primarily on the basis of local election data or
national survey data. Not so. If the case in B depends on local election
returns, then the plaintiff will have to pay an expert to retrieve local elec-
tion files from county courthouses, to digitize those records, to estimate
the correlation between race and vote choice in each election, and then
to make an argument about which elections are most probative of racial
polarization in the community. That argument would turn on factors
such as the race of the candidates, their backing from local political elites
within the minority and white communities, incumbency, the responsibil-
ities of the office in question, the date of the election, and any other
would of course depend on the credibility/impartiality of the process by which the Department
updates them.
230. See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript at 50-
71) (explaining perils of trying to infer political cohesion and polarization from votes in
actual elections).
231. See id. (manuscript at 71-73, 81-89) (explaining ecological inference depends
on racial homogeneity assumptions similar to those Supreme Court has disavowed); see
also Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting, supra note 69, at 465-68 (explaining eco-
logical inference often yields unreliable estimates where there are more than two racial
groups and significant residential integration).
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"special circumstances" that arguably bear on the degree to which racial
polarization in vote choice does or does not signify racial polarization in
enduring political preferences.232 Previous cases will provide some guid-
ance about the factors to consider in judging probativeness,233 but they
cannot resolve the ultimate question of how much weight to assign to
each election introduced in the case against B.234 (It is telling that the
lower courts have consistently rejected arguments for numeric bloc-voting
"cutoffs" under Gingles.235) By contrast, if the decision in case A turned
on a measure of ideology or racial attitudes derived from national sur-
veys236 and if the same survey data and statistical models are deployed in
case B, the holding in A will be very instructive about the likelihood of
liability in case B. And the cost of figuring out how the holding in A cuts
in case B will be minimal, assuming that the pertinent dataset and statis-
tical models are in the public domain.23 7
Finally, it is worth noting that courts can and often do create very in-
formative evidentiary guideposts without using the label "presumption."
For example, though courts have rejected the proposition that propor-
tionality between minority population share and the number of majority-
minority districts is an absolute defense to liability in vote dilution
cases,23 8 courts have nonetheless signaled that proportionality is very im-
portant239 and practitioners have had no trouble reading the signal.2 0
232. See generally Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manu-
script at 33) ("[I]nterracial elections are more probative than same-race elections [and]
endogenous elections are more probative than exogenous elections."); Katz et al., supra
note 30, at 668-70 (discussing factors relevant to identifying probative elections).
233. See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript at 24-
27, 29-31) (discussing different courts' interpretations of probativeness).
234. This is so because the weight assigned to each election depends on the proba-
tiveness of every other election in the record.
235. See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript at 33)
("As things stand today, there are no established quantitative cutoffs to distinguish polar-
ized from non-polarized communities.").
236. See infra notes 242-250 and accompanying text (describing use of national sur-
vey data to develop reliable measures of local racial attitudes).
237. Large-sample surveys by political scientists are conventionally put into the public
domain within a year or two of their completion. Standard tools for estimating local opin-
ion from national surveys are also in the public domain. E.g., Mike Malecki, Multilevel
Regression and Poststratification, Github (May 1, 2014), https://github.com/malecki/mrp
[https://perma.cc/S8MY-JEKE] (providing public domain package in statistical program-
ming language R for MRP).
238. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013-14 (1994) (explaining different
levels of proportionality may still violate VRA).
239. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 311 (D. Mass.
2004) ("One of the most revealing questions a court can ask in assessing the totality of the
circumstances is whether the affected districts exhibit proportionality...."); Campuzano
v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 200 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("For a plan to pro-
vide minority voters equal participation in the political process, it must generally provide a
number of 'effective' majority-minority districts that are substantially proportionate to the
minority's share of the state's population.").
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Similar conventions may well emerge regarding survey-based evidence of
constitutional risk, racial polarization, and minority opportunity, even
without formal recognition of the conventions as evidentiary presumptions.
In summary, the courts quite clearly have legal authority to create ev-
identiary presumptions along the lines suggested in Part II. The incre-
mental process of common law adjudication is not ideal for this purpose,
but even a gradual increase in judicial reliance on national survey data in
section 2 cases would yield a corresponding increase in the degree to
which section 2 precedents are informative about the likely resolution of
future cases (in keeping with the model of a presumption-driven section
2). DOJ may be able to accelerate this process by issuing advisory guide-
lines under section 2.
What remains to be considered is where a presumption-driven
section 2 would likely have the most bite. In particular, would the regions
of the country formerly subject to the section 5 preclearance regime end
up "covered" de facto by evidentiary presumptions under section 2? This
is the subject of the next Part.
IV. MODEL BUILDING AND RESULTS
This Part introduces the statistical machinery for generating esti-
mates of public opinion within small geographic units from national sur-
veys and presents some initial empirical results. We consider our results
provisional because they are based on models that, while facially reason-
able, have not been validated with out-of-sample data, and because the
corresponding presumptions could be defined in other ways.
24 1
A. Tools for Estimating Racial-Group Opinion Within Subnational Geographic
Unit2 42
Given a national survey dataset, there are two commonly used tech-
niques for estimating opinion within particular racial groups in discrete
geographic units. One is to disaggregate the data by race and geography,
and, if the survey is not an equal-probability sample of the population of
interest, to reweight the disaggregated data so that it matches known de-
mographics of the target population.243 The second approach is to model
responses to the survey question as a function of the respondent's demo-
240. See, e.g., Hebert et al., Realist's Guide, supra note 30, at 36 (observing propor-
tionality,' or lack thereof," is "particularly important" factor in vote dilution cases).
241. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (describing other methods of defin-
ing presumptions).
242. Some of the description of methodology in this section also appears in
Elmendorf & Spencer, Preclearance, supra note 19, at 1156-57.
243. Because of sampling challenges and non-response (and sometimes by design),
no survey is a true equal-probability sample of the target population. On reweighting, see




graphic and geographic attributes, making inferences about public opin-
ion in one geographic unit based on the responses of similarly situated
respondents elsewhere. This is done using MRP.
To illustrate the difference between the two approaches, imagine
that we want to estimate the racial attitude of white people in the city of
Boston and in the state of Massachusetts. Assume we have data from a
nationally representative sample of 2,000 white citizens. Because Boston
contains about 0.2% of the national population and Massachusetts about
2.1%, our sample would include, on average, only about four Bostonians
and forty-two respondents from Massachusetts. With sample sizes ofjust a
handful or even a few dozen respondents, random selection will quite
often yield survey samples that are considerably more or less prejudiced
than the actual population of white Bostonians or Bay Staters.24 Perhaps
the four Bostonians who took the survey are young, highly educated
women who (let us assume) tend to be much less prejudiced than older,
less affluent men. If so, the average level of prejudice in the survey sam-
ple of Bostonians is likely to badly understate average prejudice in the
population, at least if there are a lot of old, poorly educated men in Bos-
ton. Reweighting the data to the known distribution of "demographic
types" in the population is not a good fix, because some types are likely
to be absent from the sample entirely (only four Bostonians took the sur-
vey), and because the small number who did take the survey may be
highly unrepresentative of their type (not all young, highly educated
women have the same opinions).245
One solution to this problem is to pool together the responses from
multiple surveys over time and then disaggregate the pooled surveys by
race and geography. This strategy holds some promise, but for our pur-
pose requires proprietary data that have not yet been released for public
use.24 1 Another possible solution would be to conduct original surveys
244. In technical terms, the standard deviation of a sample mean or proportion is in-
versely related to the square root of the sample size. Large representative survey samples of
the adult U.S. population are rare. One important sample is the Cooperative Congressional
Election Survey (CCES), which was created for the express purpose of studying voter opin-
ion within small geographic units, and by sample size is the largest regularly conducted
survey of American voters, with about 100 respondents per congressional district. See
generally Stephen Ansolabehere & Douglas Rivers, Cooperative Survey Research, 16 Ann.
Rev. Pol. Sci. 307 (2013) (describing CCES).
245. Also, if some units in the sample receive much more weight than other units, this
blows up the variance of the sample-mean estimator-meaning that the estimate is a very
imprecise proxy for the true population mean. See Roderick J.A. Little & Donald B. Rubin,
Statistical Analysis with Missing Data 49 (2d ed. 2002) ("[Propensity weighting] removes
nonresponse bias, but ... may yield estimators with extremely high variance because re-
spondents with very low estimated response propensity receive large nonresponse weights
and may be unduly influential in estimates of means and totals.").
246. This footnote explains the problem. We need a summary measure of policy
agreement/disagreement between racial communities. The best summary measure at this
time is an "ideal point" scaled from policy preferences. See infra notes 275-280 and
accompanying text (discussing advantages of scaled ideal point measure, compared to self-
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within the unit of interest. This strategy cuts against our goal of making
(presumptive) section 2 liability easy to ascertain,247 so we do not pursue
it further here.248
Given a single national survey, MRP improves on disaggregation by
using demographic and geographic identifiers to make inferences about
similarly situated respondents. From publicly available Census data, we
know how many Bostonians are young, highly educated women and how
many are old, poorly educated men.249 To the extent that age, education,
and sex predict racial attitudes, or any other opinion of interest, we can
use what we learn from the 2,000-person national survey about old,
poorly educated men (and other demographic types) elsewhere in the
country to estimate Bostonians' opinions, weighting the estimates by
what the Census tells us is the frequency of each demographic combina-
tion in Boston.
To be sure, the racial attitudes of white people in Boston or Massachusetts
may diverge from those of their demographic doppelgangers elsewhere.
reported ideology or partisanship). But most national surveys do not include the same
policy questions, so ideal points scaled from the policy questions on each survey are not
comparable across surveys. Political scientists Chris Tausanovitch and Chris Warshaw re-
cently solved this problem by including "bridging" questions on several modules on the
CCES; this enabled them to create a "superset" of 275,000 respondents with ideal points
on the same scale. See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent
Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. Pol. 330, 332 (2013)
(describing compilation of surveys in creation of "supersurvey"). After this dataset is re-
leased into the public domain, it may be feasible to create reasonably precise estimates of
the distribution of racial group opinion within congressional districts, counties, and other
small geographic units by disaggregation (after reweighting the data to match local
demographics).
247. The problem is not simply one of cost. If original surveys must be conducted for
each case, then potential defendants may not be able to anticipate liability ex ante (with-
out conducting surveys themselves), and there are likely to be case-specific disputes about
the survey methodology, the qualifications of the experts who conducted the survey, etc.
248. If we were only interested in vote shares, there would be a fourth option, ecologi-
cal inference, but for reasons explained earlier we hope to avoid it. See supra text accom-
panying notes 78-82 (noting conclusions drawn from ecological inference are "tenuous"
when more than two racial groups are involved or ifjurisdiction is significantly integrated).
249. For example, Boston is 48% male, 17% of all residents are under eighteen years
old, and 10% are older than sixty-five. The city is 54% white and 24% black and 36% speak
a language other than English in the home. Just 20% of Boston residents graduated from
college (compared to the national average of 26.3%). The median household income in
Boston is $53,601 with 21% living below the poverty line. United States Census Bureau,
American FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (enter
"Boston, MA" in search bar; then follow "General Population and Housing Characteristics"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (data on file with the Columbia Law Review) (provid-
ing 2010 Census data). In both 2008 and 2012, about 78.5% of the city's voters voted for
Obama in the general election. Sec'y of the Commonwealth of Mass., 2008 President
General Election, Suffolk County, http://electionstats.state.ma.us/elections/view/14274/
filterbycounty:Suffolk [http://perma.cc/2V7G-7RU3]; Sec'y of the Commonwealth of




If so, imputing to Bostonians the average attitude of their respective
demographic types could generate estimates of citywide opinion that are
badly off base. MRP accounts for this by allowing the intercept term in
the regression model to vary with geography. In other words, the
estimated racial attitude of white Bostonians is adjusted upward or down-
ward depending on whether the survey respondents in Boston are more
or less prejudiced than their demographic counterparts elsewhere. The
size of the adjustment is proportional to the amount of information in
the sample about people from the geographic unit. If lots of Bostonians
answered the survey, we would have more confidence that any difference
between their answers and those of their demographic counterparts
reflects actual differences between the underlying populations. In this
case, the statistical model would make a corresponding large adjustment.
However, if few Bostonians were surveyed, the adjustment would be small.250
The flexibility of MRP extends beyond weighted adjustments based
on sample size. With just four or even forty-two respondents in each geo-
graphic unit, it would be difficult to infer very much about geographic
variation in racial attitudes. But just as we can "borrow" information from
old, white men who live elsewhere to improve our estimates of the atti-
tudes of Bostonians, so too can we borrow information from other geo-
graphic units to better understand how the attitudes of people in Boston
are likely to differ from the attitudes of demographically similar people
elsewhere. We can, for example, model the intercept term for small geo-
graphic units as a function of some larger unit in which it is nested-
Boston as a function of Massachusetts or the Northeast Region. The
larger unit, of course, includes more survey respondents. This modeling
decision allows evidence of deviations between (1) the racial attitudes of
particular demographic types within the midsized geographic units (Northeast
Region) and (2) the attitudes of the same demographic types in the na-
tional sample, to serve as evidence of the difference between people in
the small unit (Boston) and citizens across the nation. Another option is
to model the intercept for geographic units as a function of unit-level
characteristics, such as residential segregation, that theory suggests are
correlated with individual attitudes.2 5' Still another possibility is to build
in interactions between individual-level predictors and attributes of the
geographic unit. For example, the correlation between residential inte-
250. See Andrew Gelman & Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and
Multilevel/Hierarchical Models 6-8, 252-54 (2007) (explaining multilevel regression pro-
duces precision-weighted average of "complete pooling" and "no pooling" estimators). In
the running example, the complete-pooling estimator is an average of responses from all
geographic units; the no-pooling estimator is an average ofjust those responses from the
target unit, i.e., Boston. The no-pooling estimator would be imprecise (hence given little
weight) if there were few responses from the target unit.
251. See id. at 254-59 (discussing models featuring unit-level predictors).
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gration and white stereotyping of blacks may depend on the income of
white respondents.252
Once region- and unit-level characteristics such as black population
size or residential integration have been incorporated into the model,
intercepts can be estimated for small geographic units even if there are
252. See Wendy K. Tam Cho & Neil Baer, Environmental Determinants of Racial
Attitudes Redux: The Critical Decisions Related to Operationalizing Context, 39 Am. Pol.
Res. 414, 416 (2011) ("[S]cholars have found that socioeconomic conditions and eco-
nomic disparities mediate how various social contexts translate into prejudicial atti-
tudes."). The "racial threat hypothesis" posits that whites who live near large black or
other minority populations will feel more threatened by the minority group and that this
sense of threat will manifest itself in negative racial stereotypes. See Marisa Abrajano &
Zoltan Hajnal, White Backlash 117-18 (2015) (suggesting "larger out-groups can repre-
sent a threat to members of the in-group" because "proximity tends to enhance real or
perceived competition for scarce resources"); V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and
Nation 665-68 (1949) (focusing attention on Southern counties with large black popula-
tion, characterized as "hard core of the political South"); Lawrence Bobo & Vincent L.
Hutchings, Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of
Group Position to a Multiracial Context, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 951, 953 (1996) (noting indi-
viduals who "face racially changing neighborhoods ... are most likely to feel threatened
by competition from members of other minority groups"); Claudine Gay, Seeing
Difference: The Effect of Economic Disparity on Black Attitudes Toward Latinos, 50 Am.J.
Pol. Sci. 982, 995 (2006) (addressing "behavior of white Americans, whose hostility toward
minority outgroups rises in direct proportion to the size of the proximate minority popu-
lation"). The racial threat hypothesis has been used to explain geographic variation in
white support for policies such as affirmative action. See David Austen-Smith & Michael
Wallerstein, Redistribution and Affirmative Action, 90J. Pub. Econ. 1789, 1791 (2006) ("A
low-income white voter . .. may prefer a party that opposes redistribution .... "); Caroline
Tolbert & John A. Grummel, Revisiting the Racial Threat Hypothesis: White Voter Support
for California's Proposition 209, 3 St. Pol. & Pol'y Q. 183, 197 (2003) ("[O]ur findings that
whites oppose affirmative action as their neighborhoods become more racially diverse
regardless of race is more consistent with the cultural backlash hypothesis .... "). But see
Andrea Louise Campbell et al., "Racial Threat", Partisan Climate, and Direct Democracy:
Contextual Effects in Three California Initiatives, 28 Pol. Behav. 129, 141 (2006) ("The
proportion of black residents in a county ... did not affect vote choice on the affirmative
action proposition."). This hypothesis has also been used to understand geographic varia-
tion in support for redistribution. See Alberto Alesino & Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty
in the United States and Europe: A World of Difference 148-50 (2004) (analyzing effect of
"racial fractionalization" on redistribution support); Austen-Smith & Wallerstein, supra, at
1790 (addressing effect of "social cleavages" on redistribution); Hersh & Nall, supra note
161, at 13 (addressing "'spatial regime' of state and substate regions in explaining voting
behavior). Finally, the hypothesis is also helpful to understanding geographic variation in
support for harsh criminal laws and sanctions. See David Jacobs et al., Vigilantism, Current
Racial Threat, and Death Sentences, 70 Am. Soc. Rev. 656, 660 (2005) ("Theory suggests
that whites will make greater demands for punitive measures after expansions in black
presence."). If the racial threat hypothesis is correct, then black population size in the
geographic unit should be negatively correlated with whites' stereotypes, holding constant
the demographic attributes of the white population. Conditional on black population size,
it might also be the case that racial attitudes correlated with the degree of residential inte-
gration, either because racially tolerant people are drawn to integrated neighborhoods or
because quotidian interracial contact increases tolerance. This possibility can be accom-
modated by modeling the intercept term as a function of the level of residential integra-
tion in the geographic unit.
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few or no respondents in a given unit. Intercept estimates will continue
to reflect idiosyncratic information about respondents from particular
units, for example the difference between the racial attitudes of Bostonians
in the sample and the racial attitudes that the model predicts for them
based on their demographics and geographic unit. The weight attached
to idiosyncratic information is proportional to the number of respond-
ents from the unit.253
The final step in the MRP modeling process, called poststratification,
weights the estimated opinion of each demographic type (e.g., white men
over the age of sixty-five who did not attend college), within a unit by the
type's share of the unit's adult population. This yields an approximation
of the empirical distribution of opinion within the unit.
MRP has become very popular among political scientists as a way to
estimate public opinion on political issues within subnational jurisdic-
tions.25 4 It has been used to estimate opinion within states,255 congres-
sional districts,256 state legislative districts, 257 cities,258 and even local school
253. This means that models of opinion at the state level will be more strongly an-
chored to the actual survey responses of people in the geographic unit (state) than models
of opinion at the county level where there is more "shrinkage" to the average response of
similarly situated respondents. See Gelman & Hill, supra note 250, at 254 (noting averages
from counties with larger sample sizes yield multilevel estimates "close to the county aver-
ages," while averages from counties with smaller sample sizes are pulled closer to overall
state averages).
254. See Gelman & Hill, supra note 250, at 8 (noting multilevel modeling is essential
for forecasting state-by-state outcomes of U.S. presidential elections); Yair Ghitza & Andrew
Gelman, Deep Interactions with MRP: Election Turnout and Voting Patterns Among Small
Electoral Subgroups, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 762, 763-64 (2013) (explaining statistical method
and role of poststratification in modeling voting patterns); Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H.
Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 367, 369 (2009) (using MRP for "estimates of state-level policy-specific opinion");
Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, How Should We Estimate Public Opinion in the States?,
53 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 107, 109 (2009) [hereinafter Lax & Phillips, How Should We Estimate?]
(lauding simplicity of MRP analysis); Julianna Pacheco, Using National Surveys to Measure
Dynamic U.S. State Public Opinion: A Guideline for Scholars and an Application, 11 St.
Pol. & Pol'y Q. 415, 420 (2011) (describing MRP as "superior" aggregation method);
David K. Park, Andrew Gelman & Joseph Bafumi, Bayesian Multilevel Estimation with
Poststratification: State-Level Estimates from National Polls, 12 Pol. Analysis 375, 377
(2004) (describing application of multilevel estimation with poststratification to elections).
255. See, e.g., Ghitza & Gelman, supra note 254, at 774-75 (using MRP to analyze
vote choice and turnout of demographic subgroups within states); Lax & Phillips, How
Should We Estimate?, supra note 254, at 120 (concluding MRP, "if implemented using a
single, large national survey, produces estimates of state-level public opinion that are vir-
tually as accurate as those it generates using 10 or more surveys"); Pacheco, supra note
254, at 419 (explaining "MRP ... allows for the inclusion of various demographic predic-
tors to estimate state public opinion"). For a user-oriented introduction to the methods,
see Gelman & Hill, supra note 250, at 1-11 (providing brief introduction to multilevel
regression modeling and motivations).
256. See Christoper Warshaw & Jonathan Rodden, How Should We Measure District-
Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues?, 74J. Pol. 203, 216 (2012) ("MRP yields esti-
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board districts.259 The technique has been validated-and shown to out-
perform disaggregation-in a number of instances where mean public
opinion (or something close to it) within small geographic units can
actually be observed, such as vote shares for presidential candidates, or
vote shares on local referenda that address an issue that also appears on a
national survey.2 6 0
But for legal applications, it is also important to appreciate MRP's
limitations. MRP is an example of what statisticians call parametric or
model-based estimation techniques. MRP estimates depend on assump-
tions about how public opinion is likely to vary with demography and ge-
ography, and there is no a priori right way to construct a multilevel mod-
el of public opinion. One can always build a more complicated model,
with more predictor variables and more interactions between predictors.
Consider again the (potential) relationship between racial attitudes and
residential integration. As noted above, the analyst could account for this
by adding a measure of integration to the model for the intercept term.
But what if the correlation between attitudes and residential integration
runs in opposite directions for highly educated and poorly educated
whites? Highly educated whites who live in integrated neighborhoods are
probably there by choice; poorly educated whites who end up in an inte-
grated neighborhood may not be able to afford to move elsewhere and
may feel threatened by the minority population. To account for this pos-
sibility, the researcher could construct a "varying slope" model, in which
one of the demographic predictors (education) is interacted with an at-
tribute of the geographic unit (residential integration). But more elabo-
rate models are not necessarily better. Researchers have shown that more
complex MRP models sometimes yield worse estimates of target-population
mates of issue-specific district public opinion that are consistently superior to disaggre-
gated means or presidential vote shares.").
257. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 246 (stating MRP estimates had higher
correlation with 2008 presidential vote shares than disaggregated estimates at state legisla-
tive district level); Warshaw & Rodden, supra note 256, at 218 (concluding MRP "can pro-
duce reliable estimates for state legislative districts on many issues"); David E. Broockman
& Christopher Skovron, What Politicians Believe About Their Constituents: Asymmetric
Misperceptions and Prospects for Constituency Control 13-14 (July 17, 2015) (un-
published manuscript), http://stanford.edu/-dbroock/papers/broockman-skovron-asy
mmetricmisperceptions.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5QT-XH3A] (describing steps taken to
apply MRP to state legislative districts).
258. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 246, at 335-36 (stating MRP estimates
had higher correlation with 2008 presidential vote shares than disaggregated estimates at
city level).
259. Michael Berkman & Eric Plutzer, Evolution, Creationism, and the Battle to
Control America's Classrooms 83-87 (2010) (detailing MRP's advantages in estimating
local support for teaching of evolution).
260. See, e.g., Warshaw & Rodden, supra note 256, at 211 ("[T]he MRP estimates are
better predictors of referendum results than the disaggregated estimates. The MRP esti-
mates have higher correlations with the referenda results for each issue and state, and
generally smaller mean absolute errors.").
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opinion, even though the complicated model does a better job explain-
ing opinion within the pool of survey respondents.261 This phenomenon,
called overfitting, arises because the estimated parameters in the more
complex model capture idiosyncratic features of the sample that are not
representative of the target population.26 2
There are, in principle, two ways of dealing with the overfitting prob-
lem. One is to choose among candidate MRP models using a technique
known as cross-validation, whereby the data are randomly partitioned
into, say, ten equally sized chunks; the model is fit ten times sequentially
using all but one of the data chunks; and the quality of the model's pre-
dictions are evaluated by comparing them to the actual observations in
the "left out" chunk of data.23 With sufficiently large samples, cross-val-
idation usually provides a fairly accurate estimate of true, out-of-sample
prediction error-that is, how close the model's predictions are likely to
be to the actual observations in a new sample drawn at random from the
population.264 But a recent paper raises questions about whether cross-
validation reliably chooses the better MRP model.265
The other solution is to validate the MRP model with true, out-of-
sample observations of average public opinion (or a good proxy for aver-
age opinion) within the geographic units and demographic strata of in-
terest.266 As noted above, MRP models of vote intention in presidential
elections have been validated with data on the actual vote shares of the
candidates in each geographic unit, and MRP models of public opinion
on particular policy questions have been validated with vote-share data
from initiative and referendum elections on similar policy proposals.267
261.Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Philips, How Should We Estimate Sub-National
Opinion Using MRP? Preliminary Findings and Recommendations 18-24 (Apr. 10, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.columbia.edu/-jrl2l24/mrp2.pdf [http://perma.
cc/CK75-2ENZ] (finding tweaks to baseline model generate "modest gains at best and in
some cases may actually reduce the performance of MRP").
262. An important question for future work is whether machine-learning algorithms
can be used to build and assess MRP models, automating this process rather than leaving it
to the analyst's discretion. If model-building is automated, this should allay concerns that
the analyst calibrated the model to obtain results favorable to his or her client or political
party.
263. For an introduction to cross-validation, see Trevor Hastie et al., The Elements of
Statistical Learning: Data Mining, Inference, and Prediction 241-47 (2d ed. 2009).
264. See id. at 247-49 (demonstrating cross-validation on hypothetical predictor and
finding cross-validation error is close to true expected prediction error).
265. Wei Wang & Andrew Gelman, Difficulty of Selecting Among Multilevel Models
Using Predictive Accuracy, 7 Stat. & Its Interface 1, 1 (2014) (demonstrating while cross-
validation might give satisfactory estimates of pointwise out-of-sample prediction error, it
may not always be ideal for model comparison).
266. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (providing example of MRP predict-
ing actual local referendum results).
267. To be maximally convincing, however, the validation exercise should be done us-
ing data obtained after the fitted model was placed into the public domain so that third
parties can be confident that the validation data are truly "out of sample." Otherwise, one
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It is much trickier to validate MRP models concerning beliefs that
are not voted on (such as general political ideology or racial stereotypes)
or opinions within a group whose ballots are not separately tabulated
(e.g., whites, Latinos, Asians, and blacks). One option is to assume that
the model is reasonably good if it has a good theoretical justification and
the same or similar models work well in predicting vote shares in the ge-
ographic units. It seems unlikely that a model that performs well estimat-
ing public opinion as a whole would do a bad job estimating within-
group opinion, since the errors for each group would have to miracu-
lously cancel out for the overall-opinion measure to be any good.
Relying on such assumptions is not ideal, but it is no more of a
stretch than many other conventions of vote dilution litigation. Ecologi-
cal inference as traditionally practiced relies on heroic assumptions,268
elides questions about statistical precision, and uses post-hoc corrections
to paper over mathematically impossible results (such as an estimate that
130% of Latino voters supported candidate A over B).269 The analyst who
uses an MRP model at least begins with individual-level data, and to the
extent that she errs, she likely underestimates local deviation from typical
patterns of opinion of the demographic group in question.270 This seems
the appropriate epistemic posture for a federal court implementing a
federal statute: Assume that people in one part of the country are like
people in another, except insofar as the data compel another conclusion.
The best way to validate an MRP model of within-racial-group opin-
ion would be to conduct expensive, gold-standard surveys of public opin-
ion within a randomly sampled subset of the geographic units. If the
MRP predictions for each racial group in each unit are close to nonpar-
ametric estimates from the validation study, the MRP model can be ad-
judged "good."271 Seen from one angle, the challenges of validation rep-
cannot rule out the possibility that the researcher used some of the validation data to in-
form his model-building choices, essentially reverse engineering the model to fit the vali-
dation data. This standard is widely acknowledged in principle but rarely practiced. We are
aware of no published work in political science that has validated an MRP model with data
that were gathered after the model's publication.
268. A key assumption is that the political opinion of members of a racial group is un-
correlated with the demographic makeup of the neighborhood in which the person lives.
See generally Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 60 (manuscript at pt.
III.C, app. A) ("To estimate candidates' vote shares by racial group, the analyst assumes
that the proportion of white and minority voters who support each candidate is about the same in
each precinct. . . .").
269. See generally Greiner, Ecological Inference, supra note 78, at 162-63 (highlight-
ing how ecological inference approach can result in logically impossible estimates).
270. This is so because when local observations are sparse, the model pools the esti-
mate of local opinion toward the typical opinion of the demographic type/unit type in the
entire sample. For a lucid explanation and graphical illustrations, see Gelman & Hill,
supra note 250, at 251-77.
271. Short of this, one could make some headway on validation by estimating an at-
tribute or behavior relevant to political opinion for which the true distribution within ra-
cial groups and geographic units is known. The development of proprietary "big data"
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resent serious obstacles to the proposed scheme of implementing section
2 with presumptions whose application to the case at hand would depend
on MRP-generated estimates of racial group opinion. Seen from another,
it represents a golden opportunity for DOJ.
Judicial coordination on datasets and models is key to getting a
presumption-driven section 2 to do the work of section 5. If the courts
agree on datasets and models, litigants (and judges) will be able to figure
out quickly and easily which presumptions apply in a given case. DOJ has
the time and resources for gold-standard validation studies that could
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, or more.27 2 Most private litigants
do not. If DOJ is the only player in the game whose model of racial group
opinion has been validated with gold-standard surveys within a random
sample of geographic units, judicial coordination on an MRP model is
likely to occur much more quickly than if many actors (or no actors)
have validated models. And it goes without saying that the "winning"
model-the one on which courts eventually coordinate-is much more
likely to be DOJ's. Some defendants may still try to attack DOJ's model by
showing that its output is sensitive to modeling assumptions, but unless
the defendant comes forth with better model that has been validated us-
ing demonstrably out-of-sample data,273 DOJ's model is likely to prevail.
B. An Illustrative Model and Maps
To illustrate where a presumption-driven section 2 would probably
have the most bite, this section reports original results on the geography
of racial polarization in political preferences and racial stereotyping at
the county level. The details of the model and replication code are avail-
able online274 and the online appendix also shows that the results are
robust to alternative model specifications.
As section II.B.1 argued, the stereotyping results could be incorpo-
rated into a "constitutional risk" presumption. The political-preference
results could be used to establish whether minority preferences are suffi-
ciently distinct from the preferences of others to support a vote dilution
about voter registration and party preference by race presents one such opportunity. Cf.
Stephen Ansolabehere & Eitan Hersh, Validation: What Big Data Reveal About Survey
Misreporting and the Real Electorate, 20 Pol. Analysis 437, 445-58 (2012) (cross-referencing
CCES self-reports of voter registration against proprietary information in Catalist database).
272. UCLA political scientist Lynn Vavreck is in the process of developing new "gold-
standard" methods for obtaining representative samples of electorate opinion. She pays
respondents a lot of money, she offers part of the compensation as a gift, and she is trans-
parent about the purpose of the survey. Lynn Vavreck, Presentation to Research Workshop
in American Politics, University of California, Berkeley (Spring 2013).
273. By "demonstrably out-of-sample," we mean data collected after the fitted model
was published. (This assumes that DOJ's model passed an out-of-sample validation.)
274. Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Voter Discrimination, www.dougspencer.
org/research/geography-ofLdiscrimination.html [http://perma.cc/N32H-HP8G] (last visited
Oct. 21, 2015).
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claim (potential disparate impact, as explained in section II.C.1). And, at
least for judges who deem race discrimination for partisan purposes im-
permissible, the preference-polarization results could also figure into
constitutional-risk findings (section II.B.2).
The political preference measure used in this section is a one-dimensional
ideal point scaled from respondents' answers to binary policy questions
on the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).275 These
ideal points are summary measures of liberalism or conservativeness as
revealed by stated policy preferences. Ideal points calculated in this way
have become standard fare in political science research on voter behav-
ior,276 and they explain much more of the variation in vote choice than
275. Respondents answered twenty-two policy questions. We convert their answers in-
to thirty-eight actual or implied positions on binary choices. We generate ideal points us-
ing the "ideal()" function of the "pscl" package in R. Simon Jackman, pscl: Political Science
Computational Library, Stanford University, The Comprehensive R Archive Network (Mar.
29, 2015), https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/pscl/index.html [http://perma.cc/S
MK2-HH68]. For more information see Elmendorf & Spencer, Technical Appendix, supra
note 37; see also Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, An Intuitive
Explanation of MRP, Administering Section 2 of the VRA After Shelby County,
http://www.dougspencer.org/research/geographyofdiscrimination/s2_AppendixMRP.
pdf [http://perma.cc/3CRA-AGN5] (last updated Jan. 7, 2015).
Recall from section II.C.1 that there are other plausible ways of measuring political
preferences. Supra text accompanying notes 152-153. The results reported here are just
illustrative.
276. See, e.g., Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and
Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 519, 521 (2010) ("Within studies of representation, there is movement toward com-
paring voters' preferences with legislator roll call voting behavior (i.e., with legislator ideal
points)."); Cheryl Boudreau, Christopher S. Elmendorf & Scott A. MacKenzie, Lost in
Space? Shortcuts and Spatial Voting in Low-Information Elections, 68 Pol. Res. Q.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2232371 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (incorporating estimation of ideal
points for candidates and voters in study design); Stephen A. Jessee, Partisan Bias, Political
Information and Spatial Voting in the 2008 Presidential Election, 72 J. Pol. 327, 328
(2010) (discussing voters' ideal points and spatial utility model of voting); Stephen A.
Jessee, Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election, 103 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 59, 67
(2009) (noting bill parameters in ideal point model are identical for respondent answer-
ing survey question and for senator voting on proposal); Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra
note 246, at 231-32 ("We assume that both citizens and legislators have a unique set of
policies that they 'prefer' to all others. This point in the policy space is called an 'ideal
point."'); Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, Using Optimal Classification to Analyze
Public Opinion Data 3-12 (Mar. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (explaining use of scaling methods to estimate voters' ideal points);
Thad Kousser, Justin Phillips & Boris Shor, Reform and Representation: A New Method
Applied to Recent Electoral Changes 8 (Aug. 19, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260083 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
methodology of "measuring ... ideology of a sample of voters ... by comparing their an-
swers to the same comprehensive set of policy questions" to obtain "common space ideo-
logical estimates"); Boris Shor, Congruence, Responsiveness, and Representation in
American State Legislatures 4 (Aug. 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/
abstract=1697352 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing use of "standard ideal
point estimation techniques" to construct "common ideological space" for politicians and
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does self-reported ideology.277 Ideal points scaled from policy positions
are particularly valuable for comparing the political preferences of racial
groups, because there is considerable between-group variation in how re-
spondents characterize their own ideology on the liberal-to-conservative
spectrum278 and in their willingness to express a party identification.279
The scaled-ideal-point measure of political preferences is imperfect,280
but it beats self-reported ideology and party identification.
constituents); Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski, Ideology and the US Congressional Vote 12,
13 & tbl.2 (July 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2650028
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing surveys used to "characterize the ideo-
logical locations" of survey respondents).
277. See Shor & Rogowski, supra note 276, at 12-13 (explaining ideal points method
avoids problem of "projection" because respondents are "unlikely to adopt the issue posi-
tion of their favored local House candidate" on significant policy issues).
278. See Marisa Abrajano, Reexamining the "Racial Gap" in Political Knowledge, 77J.
Pol. 44, 46 (2015) (showing many Latino American survey respondents interpret word
"liberal" to mean "conservative," reflecting different use of term "liberal" in their country
of origin or ancestry). In the technical online appendix to this Article, we demonstrate
that the "racial gap" in the correlation between respondent ideology and preferences in
congressional and presidential elections is smaller when ideology is measured using ideal
points than when ideology is measured using self-reports on the seven-point scale.
Elmendorf & Spencer, Technical Appendix, supra note 37, at 9-10 & tbl.1.
279. See Zoltan L. Hajnal & Taeku Lee, Why Americans Don't Join the Party: Race,
Immigration, and the Failure (of Political Parties) to Engage the Electorate 89 tbl.3.2,
108-10 tbls.4.2 & 4.3 (2011) (showing Asian American and Hispanic American survey re-
spondents are much less willing to express party identification than African American
respondents).
280. It is imperfect (1) because it does not account for the importance that respond-
ents attach to different issues; (2) because some of the variation in scaled ideal points
probably reflects differences in political knowledge rather than differences in latent ideol-
ogy (low-knowledge respondents may make more "errors" in stating their policy positions,
see Thomas R. Palfrey & Keith T. Poole, The Relationship Between Information, Ideology,
and Voting Behavior, 31 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 511, 529-30 (1987) (concluding low-information
voters are more likely to be indifferent and unpredictable in voting behavior)); (3) be-
cause respondents who have ideal points "in the middle" may not agree with one another
very much, see Broockman, supra note 170, at 29-30 (observing individuals appearing in
ideological middle sometimes have "dramatic differences" in preferences with respect to
specific policy domains); (4) because ideal points scaled with a parametric model (as is
conventional, and as we do here) may be sensitive to the set of policy questions used in the
analysis and to functional-form assumptions about voters' utility functions, see Hare & Poole,
supra note 276, at 6-7 (noting parametric models impose constraint "that mass political
attitudes are uniformly structured across the electorate[,]" entailing assumptions about
voters' utility curves); (5) because ideal points scaled from national political issues may not
capture preferences over local politics, and as such may be poorly suited to VRA claims
concerning school district or city council elections, etc., see Boudreau et al., supra note
276 (manuscript at 21-22) (showing relatively weak correlation between voters' national
party identification and their ideal points in issue space of San Francisco politics); David
Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of
Election Law, 23 J.L. & Pol. 419, 433-44 (2007) (arguing this is likely); and (6) because
ideal points do not capture variation in political preferences that arise from and reflect
distributional politics. (Thanks to David Schleicher for pointing out this final limitation.)
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To measure ideological similarity within and between racial groups,
we use the average ideological distance (absolute value) between pairs of
citizens of the group or groups in question, divided by the average ideo-
logical distance between pairs of citizens chosen at random from the en-
tire population.281 A score greater than one indicates polarization, as it
signifies that the typical distance between two members of the group(s)
in question is greater than the typical distance between a pair of citizens
in the population as a whole. Conversely, a score less than one indicates
cohesion, that is, greater similarity within the numerator group(s) than
in the full population.282
For VRA purposes, one very nice feature of this approach is that it
can be used to answer (presumptively) all of the group cohesion ques-
tions in a vote dilution case. "Minority political cohesion" is assessed by
sampling same-race pairs of voters for the numerator; "polarization" is
assessed by sampling different-race pairs. Coalitional claims brought
jointly by two or more racial groups (which have vexed the courts) pre-
sent no special difficulty.283 Two racial groups are presumptively jointly
cohesive if the typical distance between randomly selected pairs of voters
from the two groups falls below whatever threshold the courts may estab-
lish for political cohesion in ordinary, noncoalitional cases. (To be sure,
it is an open question whether coalitional claims remain available under
section 2 after Bartlett v. Strickland.284 )
281. In mathematical notation: ave1xAL-xBJ| i E Aj E B and {k, l) E P, k # 1. In thisavelx -xIl
formula ave is the average (mean) opera or, x is an ideal point, A and B index racial
groups (the populations of which are A and 'B), and P is the entire population. When
measuring within group cohesion, A = B and i # j.
282. Because ideal points establish relative but not absolute distances between voters,
it is necessary to standardize the "similarity" measure in some way (such as by dividing by
the standard deviation of the distance between randomly sampled pairs of voters in the
entire national population).
283. As the United States becomes more racially diverse and residentially integrated,
coalitional claims will become increasingly important for minority representation, because
few racial communities will be able to satisfy the "majority-minority" requirement of
Gingles-as glossed by Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy,
J.)-on their own.
284. Bartlett forecloses "crossover" claims brought by minorities who do not compose
50% of the proposed remedial district but would be able to control the district together
with white allies. Id. at 14-15 (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J.) ("Nothing in § 2 grants
special protection to a minority group's right to form political coalitions."). Though
Bartlett expressly reserves the question of coalitional claims brought by two minority
groups who together surmount the 50% threshold, some commentators not unreasonably
see Bartlett as foretelling the demise of coalitional claims. See, e.g., Lauren R. Weinberg,
Note, Reading the Tea Leaves: The Supreme Court and the Future of Coalitional Claims
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 411, 433 (2013) (concluding
Bartlett and Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2011), "strongly suggest that if and when the
issue of coalition districts is directly presented," Court will hold they are not "afforded
protection under section 2"). On the other hand, coalitional claims present none of the
line-drawing problems that so troubled the Bartlett plurality, nor do they depend on the
existence of serious fractures in the white voting "bloc" (fractures which, as Bartlett ob-
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A key conceptual question is how to define "the entire population"
for purposes of calculating the denominator of the cohesion/polarization
measure. Should the similarity/dissimilarity of political preferences in
the numerator group(s) be measured relative to typical similarity within
the population that elects the legislative body at issue in the case or rela-
tive to the entire national population? We think the former approach
probably makes more sense. If the citizens of, say, a county, divide politi-
cally on racial lines alone, the minority community may have a very hard
time electing the county commissioners it prefers even if the typical ideo-
logical distance between minority and majority-race voters in the county
is smaller than the typical distance between any two voters in the national
population.285 But for present purposes, it is enough to provide a simple,
easily interpreted picture of geographic variation in racial polarization
throughout the nation, so the "national population" denominator will be
used.286
One other complication needs to be mentioned. The model esti-
mates the mean ideal point for "types" of voters defined by the poststrati-
fication cells (race, age, sex, education, and geographic unit). It does not
give the full distribution of ideal points within small geographic units,
which can be obtained only by conducting large surveys within each unit.
However, by sampling pairs of voters from the poststratification cells, and
imputing to them the mean ideal point estimated for the cell, one can
still generate a picture of the relative distance within and between voters
of different groups.28 1 This will tend to understate the actual diversity of
opinion within the population (because sampling is done from subgroup
means, rather than individuals), but so long as mean ideal points from
serves, would create "serious tension" with the third prong of Gingles, see Bartlett, 556 U.S.
at 16 (plurality opinion) (Kennedy,J.)). Either the two minority groups together compose
50% of the proposed remedial district or they do not. Either they are jointly politically
cohesive or they are not. This is quite different than the "crossover"-type claim at issue in
Bartlett, in which a minority group that composes a minority of the proposed remedial
district claims the ability to control it in coalition with some indeterminate sub-population
of the less-than-fully-cohesive white majority. The lower courts have split on the availability
of coalitional claims, with most courts allowing them in principle, but the relevant deci-
sions mostly predate Bartlett. See Hopkins, supra note 35, at 635-36 (summarizing cases).
285. This assumes that voters figure out the ideological positions of candidates in the
county commissioner elections and that citizens' ideological positions in national and local
politics are highly correlated. Both assumptions are questionable. See generally Christopher S.
Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and
Election Law, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363 (discussing lack of voter knowledge about candi-
dates' positions, particularly in subnational elections); Schleicher, supra note 280 (arguing
voter ideology in local and national issue spaces is likely to be only weakly correlated).
286. We use the Integrated Public Use Census Microdata as our estimate of the na-
tional population. Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken,
Matthew B. Schroeder & Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version
5.0, Univ. of Minn. (2010), https://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/Y6
5N-KRWJ].
287. In this exercise, the probability of choosing a voter in a given cell equals the rela-
tive frequency of voters in that cell.
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the poststratification cells are used for the denominator, the model will
capture whether between-racial-group differences are larger or smaller
than differences across the full set of demographic cleavages in the MRP
model (age, sex, race, education, and geography) .288
To estimate the mean ideal point of each voter type, we first subset
voters by race and fit separate models for each racial group. This allows
coefficients on the predictor variables to vary across racial groups, with-
out any "pooling" of information between groups. Put differently, we do
not try to model potential commonalities across racial groups (e.g., by
positing that the correlation between income and ideology is similar for
each racial group), and we do not use ideal points of persons of race A to
predict ideal points for persons of race B. Our county-level models in-
clude age and sex as individual-level predictors and state as an aggregate
predictor. We also include one county-level attribute: the minority per-
centage of the county's population.289
Figure 1 maps the results on ideological polarization between white
and minority citizens at the county level. It shows that the ideological gap
between white and black citizens in most counties is vastly greater than
the gap between whites and Asians, and whites and Latinos. The white-
black gap is most pronounced in the South, where the typical distance
between whites and blacks is often twice as large as the typical distance
between voting-age Americans as a whole. There is also significant white-
Asian and white-Latino polarization in Texas and in a scattering of coun-
ties elsewhere, mostly but not entirely in the South.
288. In future work, we will pursue another strategy that may better recover the diver-
sity of public opinion: modeling the ideological distance between pairs of voters of differ-
ent types, rather than the mean ideal point of each voter type. Still another possibility is to
sample from the residuals of an estimated model of mean opinion and use bootstrap
methods to estimate between-group opinion.
289. This is motivated by the "racial threat hypothesis," which posits that members of
the majority group subscribe to worse views of the minority where the minority threatens
the privilege or advantages of the majority. See supra note 252 (discussing racial threat
hypothesis). For a review of this literature and some interesting new results, see Ryan D.
Enos, What the Demolition of Public Housing Teaches Us About the Impact of Racial
Threat on Political Behavior, 109 Am. J. Pol. Sci. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1-2,
11-16) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (studying impact of exogenous removal of
black community caused by reconstruction of Chicago public housing on white voting,
finding white turnout fell over 10% and "pro-Republican leanings of voters near projects"
declined after projects demolished, supporting racial threat hypothesis).
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FIGURE 1: COUNTY-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN
THE AVERAGE WHITE VOTING-AGE CITIZEN'S IDEAL POINT AND THE




Distribution of racially polarized ideology across counties
(Legend)
Figure 2 uses the same ideal point data and MRP models to illus-
trate similarities between minority groups.291 Figure 2 drives home that
coalitional claims brought by two or more minority groups can be ana-
lyzed in essentially the same way as claims brought by a single racial
group. The courts, aided by DOJ, just need to set a quantitative threshold
for what constitutes "substantial similarity" using the measure of cohe-
sion/polarization. A cutoff of 0.5, for example, would require voters of
each minority group to be twice as close to one other, on average, as vot-
ers in the full population. Minority groups that fall on the "similar" side
of the threshold would be deemed presumptively jointly cohesive.292
290. Data: 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (N=47,234).
291. In the technical online appendix, we replicate the method of Figures 1 and 2 to
map the geography of within-group political cohesion. The results are not particularly
interesting: within counties, the estimated typical distance between voters of a given racial
group is uniformly less than one half of the typical distance between voting-age Americans
as a whole. Elmendorf & Spencer, Technical Appendix, supra note 37, at 12, 13 & tbl.2.
292. Those on the far side could not bring a coalitional claim unless they introduce
new survey or voting data to overcome the presumption of noncohesiveness.
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FIGURE 2: DIFFERENCE IN IDEAL POINTS BETWEEN MINORITY GROUPS
293
Black vs. Latino Black vs. Asian
Latino vs. Asian
Distribution of racially polarized ideology across counties
(Legend)
More cohesive More polarized
The main takeaway from Figure 2 is that the two fastest growing ra-
cial groups in the United States, Asian Americans and Latinos, are ideo-
logically very similar.294 In almost every county, the distance between
Asian American and Latino voters is less than half the typical distance
between voting age Americans as a whole. To date, however, Asian-
Latino coalitional claims under section 2 have been rare-and rarely suc-
cessful.295 If the presumption-based approach to section 2 were adopted,
many of these claims might become winners.
296
The map in Figure 3 summarizes racial stereotyping against blacks,
Latinos, and Asians at the county level.297 The map is color coded to re-
293. Data: 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (N=47,234).
294. Note that our models do not distinguish among Latino populations by national
origin. We pool information across Cuban Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans,
and others. One may fairly question whether the resulting estimates are reliable for Cuban
Americans, who may be more conservative on average than the other Latino populations.
Cf. De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1570-72 (1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), in which the trial court found that
African Americans and Cuban Americans in Dade County, Florida, had very different po-
litical preferences.
295. See Chen & Lee, supra note 35, at 391 (describing "paucity of Asian American-
focused litigation").
296. At least if the constitutional risk requirement can be satisfied. Given space limita-
tions, the question of how this requirement should be understood in coalitional cases can-
not be addressed here.
297. Formally, county-level stereotyping against group M is: ave K)I i E j Eave (S')
[{i,jJ ( M, where S is an individual's stereotype, i and j index voting-age citizens, [C is
the voting-age citizen population of the county of interest (K), Mis the racial group being
stereotyped, M is the population of that racial group, P is the national population of voting-
age citizens, and the averages are taken over X and P (exclusive of ivI), respectively. In turn,
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flect the proportion of residents in each county that harbor a substan-
tially negative stereotype of each racial group. We distinguish substantial
from insubstantial negative stereotyping based on the predictive value of
racial stereotypes with respect to vote choice. More specifically, we model
the probability of voting for Obama in 2008 as a function of anti-black
stereotyping, political ideology, party identification, age, sex, race, educa-
tion, income, and region among respondents to the 2008 Annenberg
National Election Survey and the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis
Project survey.298 Respondents who view blacks more positively than whites
were no more or less likely to vote for Obama than the national median
voter. Respondents whose views of blacks are more than one standard
deviation more negative than the national average were much less likely
to vote for Obama than Hillary Clinton in the 2008 primary, less likely to
vote for Obama than John McCain in the 2008 general election, and
much more likely to be "Democratic defectors" who voted for John Kerry
in 2004 and McCain in 2008. Based on this relationship, we use the anti-
black stereotyping value that is one standard deviation more negative
than the national average (a value of 2.49 on a 12-point scale) as the cut-
off for identifying substantial negative stereotyping. Figure 3 plots the
proportion of respondents in each county that exceed this cutoff.
S[ = EZ RZ - R9, where RZ is respondent i's rating of minority group M on attribute z
(e.g., intelligence), and R° is the respondent's rating of his or her own racial group on the
same attribute.
298. The balance of this paragraph summarizes the modeling and results in
Elmendorf & Spencer, Preclearance, supra note 19, at 1143-56.
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FIGURE 3: COUNTY-LEVEL DIFFERENCES IN THE PROPORTION OF NON-
COETHNIC SURVEY RESPONDENTS WITH SUBSTANTIALLY NEGATIVE
STEREOTYPES OF EACH MINORITY GROUP
299
Anti black Anti Latino
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There are striking geographic patterns to the stereotyping of blacks,
Asian Americans and Latinos. Non-blacks in the former Confederacy har-
bor the most negative stereotypes about blacks. Anti-Latino stereotyping
is strongest in New Mexico, Arizona, Southern California, and Southwestern
Texas. Substantial anti-Asian stereotyping is much less prevalent across
the country, yet relatively strong in New Mexico and a few counties in the
upper Midwest.
Read together, Figures 1, 2, and 3 contain important lessons about
what might emerge as the de facto "coverage formula" of a presumption-
driven section 2-that is, the geographic regions in which the presump-
tions would operate to shift core evidentiary burdens to the defendant.
For purposes of claims brought by African Americans, the presumptions'
coverage would be substantially similar to section 5's coverage pre-Shelby
County. Black-white ideological polarization and negative stereotyping of
blacks are both concentrated in the Deep South. For claims brought by
Latinos and Asians, the picture is more complicated because negative
stereotyping and ideological polarization with respect to these groups
apparently do not go hand in hand. Asians face the worst stereotypes in
the upper Midwest, but are most polarized (vis-a-vis whites) in Texas.
Anti-Latino stereotyping and ideological polarization both occur in Texas
and to some extent in the upper South, but are not geographically con-
cordant elsewhere. So even though Asians and Latinos represent good "coa-
299. Data: 2010 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project Survey (N=19,187).
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litional partners" under section 2 by dint of their ideological similarity,
they may have difficulty satisfying the constitutional-risk element of a section
2 claim.3 oo
C. Next Steps
The modeling and results reported here speak to the feasibility of
implementing section 2 with rebuttable presumptions whose application
in a given case would be determined using national survey data, but this
Article does not establish the optimality of any particular presumption,
measure of preferences, or predictive model. There is a good deal of re-
search still to be done on these questions and this Part closes by enumer-
ating the most important empirical projects for better grounding and
targeting a presumption-driven section 2:
" Develop other plausible measures of racial-group political prefer-
ences and assess the sensitivity of geography-of-polarization/cohesion
results to the choice of measure.301
" Investigate whether racial-group political preferences can be well
represented with a single summary measure that is independent
of the governmental body at issue or whether different classes of
governments (e.g., school boards, city councils, state legislatures,
Congress) require different measures.3 2
" Investigate sensitivity of geography-of-polarization results to alter-
native specifications of the MRP mode30 3 and explore machine-
learning algorithms for "impartial" model selection and
specification. 304
" Replicate geography-of-discrimination results using alternative
measures of racial attitudes.305
300. Even if the courts accept the "partisan incentives" arguments about constitu-
tional risk, the results indicate that white-Latino and white-Asian ideological polarization
(and hence political incentives to discriminate) rarely reaches the levels of white-black
ideological polarization. Supra Fig. 1.
301. We touch briefly on several alternative measures in section ILC.1, supra notes
152-153. Regarding the strengths and limitations of the ideal point measure used in this
Article, see supra notes 276-280 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (noting potential imperfections of
measuring political preference by ideal points).
303. Cf. supra note 288 (discussing alternative approach to estimating ideological po-
larization within small geographic units).
304. See supra note 262. Machine-learning methods can make model specification
less dependent on the analyst's judgment calls. See generally Bertrand Clarke, Ernest
Fokoue & Hao Helen Zhang, Principles and Theory for Data Mining and Machine
Learning (2009) (explaining machine-learning methods and model building). As such,
they can help to allay concerns that a particular model was chosen because the analyst
"liked" its results.
305. It would be particularly helpful to have a behavioral measure of disparate treat-
ment or differential sympathy, one that is less vulnerable to social-desirability biases than
the explicit stereotyping measure used here, and that tracks the equal protection norms
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" Use MRP or other techniques to estimate the frequency of regis-
tered voters and likely voters within the poststratification cells of
an MRP model of racial group opinion. (This would make it pos-
sible to ground section 2 presumptions in the distribution of
opinion among registered or likely voters, as opposed to the citi-
zen voting-age population.306)
" If resources are available, validate MRP models with large-N sur-
veys in a randomly selected subset of jurisdiction,3 7 or (second
best) with studies of a politically relevant behavior or attitude
with respect to which the joint distribution of race and the behav-
ior/attitude in the population can be treated as known.30 8
" Develop protocols for converting MRP-generated presumptions
into informative priors for use with Bayesian ecological inference
models.309
" Develop models to estimate minority opportunity in non-major-
ity-minority districts, so that presumptions about which districts
are minority-opportunity districts can be refined.31 0
against disparate treatment. For an explanation of why we rely on explicit stereotyping
measures for the time being, see Elmendorf & Spencer, Preclearance, supra note 19, at
1143-44. Historical and cultural studies also suggest hat Asian Americans are stereotyped
differently than blacks and Latinos. Specifically, Asians are often represented as "perpetual
foreigners" and "model minorities." See Gary Okihiro, Margins and Mainstreams 134-42
(1994) (describing historical characterization of Asian Americans as "yellow peril" and
"model minority"); Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans, 27 Pol.
& Soc'y 105, 106, 118 (1999) (noting triangulation of Asian Americans as "outsiders or
aliens" and as "model minority" compared to blacks). We are grateful to Fred Lee for
directing us to this literature. Future studies should assess the sensitivity of our geography-
of-discrimination results to these alternative measures of attitudes towards Asians.
306. Poststratification by the population of registered or likely voters requires this
prior modeling exercise because the Census Bureau asks only a small sample of Americans
about voting and registration. The Voting and Registration Supplement is included in the
November Current Population Survey, a survey of approximately 50,000 households.
Voting and Registration, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socde
mo/voting/ [http://perma.cc/W5EU-XELG] (last modified July 16, 2015).
307. See supra notes 235-267 and accompanying text (suggesting techniques for esti-
mating opinions of racial groups in specific geographic units).
308. See supra note 271 (suggesting data about voter registration and party prefer-
ence by race could be one such attribute).
309. This is one way to structure litigants' attempts to overcome the presumptions.
Bayesian methods have been used in most recent work by leading political methodologists
on ecological inference. E.g., Glynn & Wakefield, supra note 80; Greiner & Quinn, RxC
Ecological Inference, supra note 219; Ori Rosen et al., Bayesian and Frequentist Inference
for Ecological Inference: The RxC Case, 55 Statistica Neerlandica 134 (2001). But we are
aware of no work to date on the establishment of informative priors for use in Bayesian
Ecological Inference models.
310. Cf. Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting
and the Future of Black Representation, 48 Emory L.J. 1209, 1240-41 (1999) (estimating
white crossover voting for black candidates in congressional races); Bernard Grofman et
al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical
Evidence, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1383, 1407-09 (2001) (same).
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While these research projects could greatly strengthen a presump-
tion-driven section 2, they are not essential to get it up and running. Vote
dilution cases have long been litigated using somewhat shaky methods of
ecological inference and the courts have muddled through.3 ' The imple-
mentation of a presumption-driven section 2 can proceed similarly.
CONCLUSION
Numerous commentators in the wake of Shelby County offered pro-
posals for putting section 5 back to work with new coverage formulas or
"bail-in" remedies.1 2 This Article suggests another tack: Establish eviden-
tiary presumptions under section 2 that shift the burden of proof to de-
fendants in political jurisdictions where the risk of unconstitutional race
discrimination with respect to voting is elevated. Where the presump-
tions apply, section 2 would function much like section 5: It would be
fairly easy to block potentially discriminatory electoral reforms before
they take effect and lawmakers would have correspondingly strong ex-
ante incentives to gather information about the likely effects of reforms
on racial minorities and to mitigate adverse impacts.
The empirical results reported in this Article suggest that a presumption-
driven section 2 would "cover" most of the Deep South for purposes of
claims brought by African Americans, much like section 5 prior to Shelby
County. But the picture is more complicated for Asian Americans and
Latinos. These groups, while jointly politically cohesive, are generally less
ideologically polarized vis-a-vis whites than are African Americans, and
the areas of greatest white-Asian and white-Latino polarization are not
(consistently) the areas with the most negative stereotyping of Asians and
Latinos.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for realizing a presumption-driven
section 2, implemented with national survey data, is getting the courts to
define and operationalize the presumptions similarly. Congress could
solve this problem by authorizing DOJ to issue substantive rules under
311. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text (considering Greiner's critiques
of ecological inference and lack of attention paid by courts).
312. See, e.g., Elmendorf & Spencer, Preclearance, supra note 19, at 1127-28 (pro-
posing new section 5 coverage formula); Bernard Grofman, Devising a Sensible Trigger for
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 12 Election L.J. 332, 334 (2013) (suggesting new "trig-
ger" conditions for section 5); Morgan Kousser, Gutting the Landmark Civil Rights
Legislation, Reuters: Analysis & Opinion (June 26, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2013/06/26/gutting-the-landmark-civil-rights-legislation [http://perma.cc/36XX-
XJ9U] (recommending updated coverage formula and automatic "bail in" solutions);
Spencer Overton, How to Update the Voting Rights Act, Huffington Post (June 25, 2013,
12:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/spencer-overton/how-to-update-the-voting_b_
3497350.html [http://perma.cc/W23X-L97T] ("Congress should update the coverage for-
mula to require that states and localities with recent voting rights violations preclear new elec-
tion law changes."); Richard Pildes, One Easy, but Powerful, Way to Amend the VRA, Election
Law Blog (June 28, 2013, 6:53 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=52349 [http://perma.
cc/K7M3-NWGU] (advocating revision of section 3's "bail-in" provision).
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section 2. Even without a grant of rulemaking authority, DOJ may be able
to induce judicial coordination by issuing guidance documents, which
would be owed Skidmore deference, and by sponsoring model-validation
studies. And if DOJ stays on the sidelines or is rebuffed by the courts,
case-by-case litigation using national survey data has some potential to
gradually reform the law of section 2, in ways that reduce the cost and
increase the predictability of voting rights enforcement.
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